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T he co n c lu s io n s  o f  the 5th B ra in storm in g  S ess io n  on  the Treatm ent o f  Sm all E co n o m ies  
in  International Trade N eg o tia tio n s  (A sso c ia tio n  o f  C aribbean States, P ort-o f-S p ain , 28  
N o v em b er  2 0 0 5 )  recom m en d ed  that a m eetin g  shou ld  b e  h eld  w ith  the participation  o f  
rep resen tatives o f  subregional in tegration  organ ization s to  ex a m in e  the p ro v is io n s for Specia l 
and D ifferen tia l Treatm ent in c lu d ed  in  the d ifferen t in tegration  sch em es.
T o  th is end, the A sso c ia tio n  o f  C aribbean States (A C S ) d ec id ed  to  undertake, w ith  the  
jo in t co llab oration  o f  the E co n o m ic  C o m m iss io n  for L atin  A m erica  and the C aribbean (E C L A C )  
and the S istem a  E c o n ó m ic o  L atin oam erican o  y  del C aribe (S E L A ), stud ies on  the incorporation  
o f  sp ec ia l and d ifferential treatm ent in  reg ion al in tegration  agreem ents, and in  particular in  
C A R IC O M , Central A m erica  and the A n d ean  C om m u n ity .
T h is d ocu m en t p rov id es an a n a lysis  and a ssessm en t o f  S p ecia l and D ifferen tia l T reatm ent 
in  C A R IC O M . Its o b jec tiv es  are to: (i) d escrib e  and an a ly ze  the p ro v is io n s for S p ecia l and  
D ifferen tia l treatm ent in  C A R IC O M ; (ii)  estab lish  their purpose and ex a m in e  h o w  th ese  h ave  
b een  rendered operational in  practice; ( iii)  estab lish  the e ffec ts  and im p lica tio n s on  sectors, 
firm s, products rece iv in g  sp ecia l and d ifferential T reatm ent; ( iv )  p rov id e  p o licy  
recom m en d ation s regarding S p ecia l and D ifferen tia l Treatm ent.
S p ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent p ro v is io n s w ere  d esig n ed  in  prin cip le  to  fac ilita te  the  
a c c e ss io n  and participation  o f  the L e ss  D e v e lo p e d  E c o n o m ie s  and in  particular o f  the  
O rganisation  o f  the E astern C aribbean States (O E C S ) in  the C A R IC O M  trade and integration  
regim e.
E v en tu a lly  th ese  m easu res cou ld  contribute to  narrow  the d iv id e  b e tw een  the L e ss  and  
the M ore D e v e lo p e d  C ountries (L D C s and M D C s), resp ectiv e ly . T he form er group, w h ich  w a s  
granted a sp ecia l status w ith in  C A R IC O M , that o f  b e in g  ‘d isad van taged ’ in c lu d es the M em b er  
States o f  the O rgan isation  o f  E astern C aribbean States (O E C S ) and B e liz e . T he latter group  
com p rises B arbados, G uyana, Jam aica, and T rinidad and T obago.
T he C A R IC O M  Treaty (1 9 7 3 )  sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent p ro v is io n s in clu d ed  
im port restrictions but a lso  the im p o sitio n  o f  capital controls and m on itorin g  o f  capital f lo w s . In  
practice sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent p ro v is io n s w ere  lim ited  to  quantitative restrictions. 
T he m ain  o b jec tiv e  w a s  to  protect the L D C s and in  particular the O E C S intraregional trade share.
Sp ecia l and d ifferential treatm ent p ro v is io n s a llo w ed  the estab lish m en t o f  so m e o f  the  
m ajor firm s and industries w ith in  the O E C S. T he em pirical ev id en ce  a lso  sh o w s that in  its in itia l 
stages the im p lem en ta tion  o f  sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent p ro v isio n s co in c id ed  w ith  a 
rela tive  im p rovem en t in  the G D P  per capita  o f  L D C s rela tive  to  that o f  the M D C s. H o w ev er , th is  
ten d en cy  reverted  and th is co in c id es  w ith  a lo ss  in  in tra-O E C S m arket share. T his grou p in g  
ex h ib ited  a sim ilar perform ance w ith in  C A R IC O M  and a lso  at the extraregional lev e l. In  
addition, the O E C S m em b er States b eca m e exporters, rather than recip ien ts o f  net o f  resource  
flo w s.
Executive summary
T he su ccesso r  to  the C A R IC O M  T reaty, the R e v ise d  T reaty o f  C haguaram as (2 0 0 1 )  
ad d resses sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent in  C hapter VII. It is  d iv id ed  in to  tw o  sectio n s. T he  
first p rov id es a reg im e for d isad van taged  cou n tries, reg io n s and sectors. T he seco n d  p rov id es a 
sp ecia l reg im e for le s s  d ev e lo p ed  countries. C hapter V II con tem p la tes the im p o sitio n  o f  im port 
restrictions. M o st im portant, the first reg im e in c lu d es the estab lish m en t o f  a R eg io n a l 
D e v e lo p m e n t F und w h o se  purpose is  the p ro v is io n  o f  fin an cia l or tech n ica l a ssista n ce  to  
disad van taged  countries, reg ion s, and sectors. T he incorporation  o f  a D e v e lo p m e n t Fund  
u n d erscores the recogn ition  that sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent p ro v is io n s  shou ld  not b e  
lim ited  on ly  to  trade p ro v is io n s but m u st a lso  incorporate fin an cia l p rov ision s.
T he w a y  in  w h ich  th ese  p ro v is io n s are still under d iscu ss io n  and the sp e c if ic s  o f  their  
im p lem en ta tion  are still to  b e  determ ined. T he region al d ev e lo p m en t fund w a s estab lish ed  in  
January 2 0 0 6 . T he O E C S h a v e  a lso  p rop osed  the tariffica tion  o f  quantitative restrictions to  a llo w  
for the protection  and ex p a n sio n  o f  their  d o m estic  m anufacturing sector.
T he ca se  o f  C A R IC O M  h ig h lig h ts  three im portant le s so n s  regarding sp ecia l and 
differential treatm ent. F irst, the tem porary protection  o f  d o m estic  industry, e sp ec ia lly  o f  the  
m ajor sectors, can y ie ld  p o sit iv e  b en efits . M o st countries, i f  not all, h ave a lw a y s  p rotected  their  
sectoral ‘crow n  j e w e ls .’ S econ d , protection  b y  i t s e lf  m ay not b e  w e lfa re -en h a n c in g  or prom ote  
d iv ersifica tio n  u n less  accom p an ied  b y  targeted  m easu res o f  p u b lic  p o licy . In th is sen se  p o licy  
m akers shou ld  exp lore  the fea sib ility  o f  com p lem en tin g  sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent 
p ro v isio n s w ith  th o se  pertain ing to  a m an aged  trade strategy. F in a lly , reg ion al in tegration  
agreem en ts m u st incorporate the fin an cia l d im en sio n  in  the sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent 
p rov ision s. C onstrained  a ccess  to  fin a n ce  and the e x is ten ce  o f  th in  capital m arkets rem ain  m ajor  
o b sta c les  to  structural ch an ge and susta ined  lon g-term  e c o n o m ic  grow th  in  the O E C S and in  
general in  C A R IC O M .
i i  i
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The concept of special and differential treatment responds to an empirical fact. Regional 
inequalities and disparities are inescapable facts of any economic integration scheme. Disparities 
exist in terms of size, economic structure, performance and development. Regional integration 
agreements have dealt with these in two ways.
The first is to let market forces work their way through free trade and movement of 
capital and narrow the disparities. Within such a setting, countries would specialize in the 
products for which they have comparative advantage. Also capital flows would occur to the 
country which is relatively undercapitalized and which are also in general the less developed 
regions, responding to the expectation of higher returns. Greater levels of investment would 
translate into higher levels of productivity, income and development. This would eventually lead 
to a process of income and growth convergence.
The second approach recognizes that a regional agreement guided by unfettered market 
forces among unequal members may aggravate, rather than narrow, existing disparities. As a 
result regional agreements must incorporate mechanisms, provisions and more precisely a 
regional policy to level the playing field among different member countries or regions.
Some regional trading arrangements, such as for example CARICOM, grants special 
status and preferences to some of its signatory member States.1 These are not necessarily 
compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article I, Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) Clause which bars discrimination from trade, or the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) understanding of Special and Differential Treatment.
In the WTO texts (1994) the concept of special and differential treatment is embodied 
solely in a set of provisions allowing developing countries greater flexibility in terms of 
obligations and time frames to overcome these so called ‘adjustment costs.’ These provisions are 
grouped under four headings: (i) those recognizing the interests of the least developed and 
developing countries; (ii) the measures that reduce or ease the rules and obligations that 
developing economies have to meet; (iii) the provisions providing for longer time frames for the 
implementation of obligations; and (iv) the provisions for technical assistance (WTO, 1999c, 
p.225).2
I. Introduction
1 The treaty establishing CARICOM (1973) provided for the creation of two distinct entities: the Caribbean 
Community and the Common Market. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has 15 member states (Antigua and 
Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago). The Bahamas is not a 
member state of the Common Market. CARICOM has five associate members (Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands). Aruba, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, the Netherlands 
Antilles, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico are observers. Six member states are considered more developed 
countries (MDCs) (Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) and eight countries 
are considered less developed countries (LDCs) (Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Saint 
Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines). This study deals basically with the CARICOM 
members excluding Haiti.
2 See, WTO. Special and Differential Treatment. Sypnosis o f WTO Agreements and Related Topics. 
MM/LIB/SYN4. 23 October 2000 for a detailed list o f the provisions of the WTO Agreements on Special and 
Differential Treatment.
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However, the WTO recognizes two exceptions to the MFN clause. ‘Countries that form a 
customs union or a free trade area can ‘share preferred arrangements. As well developed 
countries can provide assistance through non-discriminatory preferences.’
In the CARICOM Treaty, the existence of disparities among its member States was 
recognized early on by the established divide between the More Developed and Less Developed 
Territories in the Supplemental Agreement (1968) of the Agreement for the Establishment of the 
Caribbean Free Trade Association signed in 1965. It was established in a more define format 
(More and Less Developed Countries, MDCs and LDCs, respectively) in the Chaguaramas 
Treaty (1973).
The treaty included several provisions granting asymmetric treatment to the LDCs as 
these countries were considered ‘disadvantaged’ in relation to the MDCs. These were contained 
in the Special Regime for Less Developed Countries (Chapter VII, arts. 51 to 62) and in several 
other provisions in the Treaty. These provisions included the suspension of common market 
origin treatment and the regulation of finance and capital flows for the development of the LDCs
In the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001) which is the basic legal text for the 
establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) the asymmetry issues are 
explicitly addressed in two sections of Chapter VII. The first establishes a regime for 
disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors. The second provides a special regime for less 
developed countries.
As in its predecessor text, the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas includes the suspension of 
common market origin (Art.164). In addition, and most important it establishes a development 
fund (Art. 158) whose purpose is the provision of financial or technical assistance to 
disadvantaged countries, regions, and sectors.
The CSME was formally launched in 2006 with six initial member States (Barbados, 
Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago). The Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) member States joined in the middle of the year following the 
establishment of the Regional Development Fund. The precise measures for its implementation 
are currently being discussed and finalised by CARICOM member States.
This document provides an analysis and assessment of special and differential treatment 
in CARICOM. Its objectives are to: (i) describe and analyze the provisions for Special and 
Differential treatment in CARICOM; (ii) establish their purpose and examine how these have 
been rendered operational in practice; (iii) establish the effects and implications on sectors, 
firms, products receiving special and differential treatment; (iv) provide policy recommendations 
regarding special and differential treatment. The document is structured accordingly.
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A. The provisions for special and differential treatment
Provisions for special and differential treatment were included for the first time in the 
Supplemental Agreement (1968) of the Agreement for the Establishment of the Caribbean Free 
Trade Association signed in 1965. The Supplemental Agreement was meant “to facilitate the 
accession of the OECS to the trade regime” established by CARIFTA.
The provisions for special and differential treatment were included in article 39 which 
contemplated the suspension of ‘area tariff treatment’ by a country mainly to promote industrial 
development. These provisions were included in one form or another in subsequent CARICOM 
agreements.
The agreement on the Harmonization of Fiscal Incentives to Industry (June, 1973), signed 
one month before the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community and Common Market (July 
1973)3 made the distinction between LDCs and MDCs.
More specifically, the agreement on the Harmonization of Fiscal Incentives to Industry 
sought to promote investment from domestic and foreign sources; reduce competition among 
members by placing a ceiling on benefits; target incentives at enterprises with high value added; 
and seek regional convergence by giving greater fiscal incentives to the LDCs.4
The Chaguaramas Treaty (1973) contained as well several provisions providing 
asymmetric treatment to the LDCs. These were contained in the Special Regime for LDCs 
(Chapter VII, arts. 51 to 62) and in several other provisions in the Treaty.
The Chaguaramas Treaty marks a change in the conceptualization of special and 
differential provisions as these addressed both the ‘real’ and ‘financial’ dimensions of trade and 
development. Indeed, in the Chaguaramas Treaty finance plays an essential part in the granting 
of asymmetric treatment. More to the point, it can be said that trade and finance were conceived 
as two intrinsically interrelated aspects of special and differential treatment, something which 
has never entered the realm of multilateral negotiations.
The rationale for the granting of special and differential treatment included, inter alia, to: 
(i) provide an increased flow of resources to the LDCs; (ii) reduce the cost and adverse 
repercussions of participating in regional policy instruments; (iii) to recognize the differences in 
initial conditions; (iv) minimize polarization among member States.5
Chapter VII of the Chaguaramas Treaty includes clauses of good endeavor which refer to 
the inclusion of the ‘the special needs of the less developed countries.’ It also maintains that
3 See Agreement on the Harmonization of Fiscal Incentives to Industry in The CARICOM System (2003), p.172.
4 In this sense the Agreement on Harmonization recognized the Principle of Special and Differential Treatment as 
being applicable within the Caribbean Common Market. The instruments included, as with the preceding domestic 
legislation, profit tax holidays, tariff exemptions, export allowances for extraregional exports following the 
expiration of the tax holidays, dividend payments, loss-carry forward, and depreciation allowances.
5 Lestrade (1984).
II. Special and differential treatment in the CARICOM Treaty
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government in the less developed economies can intervene via quantitative or qualitative 
restrictions to protect their production and/or via subsidies to stimulate exports.
The Treaty’s most important articles are 56 and 59. The former allows the LDCs to 
suspend common market origin treatment restrictions on grounds of production in the LDCs. It 
also permits the LDCs to impose quantitative restrictions on competing products. It should be 
understood that article 56 referred mainly to quantitative restrictions.6
These trade provisions were complemented by those of article 59 which addressed the 
financial needs of the LDCs. Article 59 explicitly stated that the MDCs agree to cooperate in: (i) 
facilitating joint ventures; (ii) negotiating double taxation agreements in respect of the income 
from investments in the LDCs by residents of other member States; and (iii) facilitating the flow 
of loan capital to the LDCs. These financial provisions were complemented by article 37 which 
sought to regulate the flows of capital ‘giving attention to the particular needs of the LDCs’.
In a nutshell, as initially conceived, special and differential treatment was a three-legged 
strategy which included, the regulation of trade (commodity and service flows), the regulation of 
capital movements and the facilitation of flows of loan capital to the LDCs.
In practice however, the special and differential provisions were partially applied and 
were limited to those included under article 56. That is, the focus of asymmetrical treatment was 
placed on the introduction of restrictions on the entry of MDC (and extra regional) products into 
the OECS. In other words, the objective of special and differential treatment was mainly oriented 
to the preservation of the OECS market share within the OECS.
CARICOM countries formed the regional CARICOM Investment Corporation CIC) 
which was meant to be a vehicle to transfer resources from the MDCs to the LDCs (see Box 1 
below).7 The CIC was created to provide resources to the OECS at concessional rates since firms 
and enterprises of the OECS member States are credit rationed, not being able to comply with 
commercial bank requirements for granting a loan. The cost of debt was considered to be too 
high. Note that this is still presently the case. In a recent survey of 90 small and medium sized 
firms, half of those interviewed indicated that their main constraint on diversification, growth 
and development was the lack of access to finance.
Unfortunately the CIC never fulfilled its task. As put by Lestrade (1984, p.270): “Less 
than ten years after its establishment the CIC was wound up and had become rather ineffectual 
five years earlier...The CIC should have been the major manifestation of the LDC thrust that
6 It should be pointed out however that Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis have actually switch from quantitative 
restrictions to the application of tariffs (tariffication).
7 The Governments of the Commonwealth Caribbean Countries through their heads of delegations to the eighth 
conference of Heads of Government of Commonwealth Caribbean Countries assembled in Georgetown, Guyana, 
from 9 to 12 April, 1973. Point three (3) o f the agreement defined the role of the Caribbean Investment Corporation. 
The Corporation was used for the promotion and establishment of industries (table 1) in Less Developed Countries. 
The enterprises from Less Developed Countries were supposed to particularly benefit from the establishment of the 
Caribbean Investment Corporation (CIC), where recognizing the urgent need for a more balanced approach to the 
distribution of benefits accruing from the Caribbean Free Trade Area, direct financing would be provided to the 
private sector, public sector, national and regional finance intermediaries.
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was built into the CARICOM arrangements. Its struggles over the years and its acknowledged 
failure constitute a lesson in the limited possibility of organizing a transfer of financial resources 
to the LDCs.”
B o x  1
A greem ent establishing the C aribbean Investm ent C orporation  (Excerpts)
The Caribbean Investment Corporation was established for the promotion of the industrial 
development including the development of agro-based industries and of integrated agricultural and 
industrial complexes of the Less Developed Countries. To this end the Corporation was empowered to: (i) 
make equity investments in industrial enterprises in the Less Developed Countries; (ii) dispose of its equity 
investments within the Region in order to replenish its financial resources; (iii) guarantee suppliers' credits; 
(iv) administer, manage and account for its financial resources; (v) provide the technical assistance where 
necessary for the preparation and analysis of projects to be financed, and do all such other acts that may be 
necessary or incidental to the achievement of its purposes and the exercise of its functions.
The Corporation was to invest in projects which are financially viable, due regard being paid to 
two other important criteria: (i) the ability of the projects in which it invests to promote further industrial 
and economic development in the economy of the Less Developed Country concerned; and (ii) the 
creation of employment opportunities in the Less Developed Country concerned.
The Caribbean Investment Corporation had the authority to borrow money, grants loans, and
invest the resources that were not needed for its operations.__________________________________________
Source: CARICOM Secretariat (2006)______________________________________________________________
The financial dimension of special and differential treatment was not incorporated into 
the implementation of the provisions for special and differential treatment. Special and 
differential treatment became mainly a vehicle for protection of existing industries and firms and 
the establishment of new firms under the auspices of subsidies and incentives, much in the spirit 
of the 1965 Supplemental Agreement to Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).
The understanding of special and differential treatment in the CARICOM Treaty, as 
reflected in specific provisions particularly in articles 56 and 59, marked a definite step forward, 
as it integrated the real and financial aspects of trade and economic relationships. Its limited 
application to the real sphere was in fact a set back.
B. The firms and products benefiting from article 56
Article 56 which was in force until December 2005 is considered to have facilitated the 
establishment of selected firms and associated products such as aerated beverages, footwear, 
soaps, candles, furniture, margarine, plastic bags, paints and varnishes, and corrugated 
galvanized sheets.8
This is attested by the responses to a survey administered in the form of a short 
questionnaire to 63 companies which were identified as companies eligible for the receipt of 
benefits of Article 56 (see table 1 below).9 The questions included, among others, the type of
8 See, Lestrade (1984) and OECS (2006).
9 The survey was administered by telephone, fax and electronic mail. Respondents were contacted through each of 
these means where possible (i.e. where any of the methods of contact were available such as telephone number, fax
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manufactured products; number of employees; the type of special and differential benefits 
received and its impact, as well as the time frame during which the benefits were received.
Sixty-two firms in the OECS benefited from special and differential treatment. This is 
shown in Table 2 below, which provides a list of the products by country and respective number 
of firms.
Figures 1 and 2 below show the country share of article 56 firms and the product share. 
Saint Lucia followed by Grenada and Antigua and Barbuda have the highest share of article 56 
firms (25 per cent, 17 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively). At the product level, furniture, 
followed by food products and aerated beverages are the products that benefited the most from 
article 56 (37 per cent, 24 per cent and 18 per cent of the total). At the other end of the spectrum, 
arts and craft is the product that benefits the least from article 56 provisions.
number or e-mail address.) There were 12 responses to the questionnaire; a 19% response rate. The most popular 
channel of response was fax through which six (6) responses were received, next was telephone interview through 
which five (5) responses were received and 1 response was sent via electronic mail. The countries with the largest 
number of respondents was Saint Lucia with four (4) respondents next was Antigua and Barbuda and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines with three (3) respondents each; Dominica and Grenada had one (1) respondent each.
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Table 1
Tabulated responses to a questionnaire on the provisions of benefits of Special and Differential Treatment to the LDCs
Company Sector/
Product(s)
No. of Persons 
Employed
Benefits Received Years Receiving 
Benefits
Will CSME affect 
benefits?
Further Comments
Antigua Brewery Aerated Beverages 
(Soft Drinks)
54 None N/A CSME will have a 
negative effect on the 
smaller economies of 
the region
The application of equal 
rules among unequal 
partners is unreasonable; 
SDT must be applied to 




Furniture 5 None N/A Not really since 
currently Products are 
entering the countries 
from both inside and 






Sometime2, 4 or 
6 on a temporary 
basis.
Import Restrictions Six months in 
1995 or 1996
N/A Benefits aren’t being 
received although 
authorities claim that the 
industry is receiving 
protection
Simeon’s Furniture Furniture Import Restrictions Protection ended 
approx one year 
ago.
No Protection currently 
being received. There 
have been no updates on 
the status of the switch 
from Article 56 to 164.
L&M Investments 
Ltd.
Industrial Gases 10 No Answer given but 
it was indicated that 
benefits were received
Approx 10 years Yes, Negatively, 
especially in countries 
where local 
manufacturers cannot 
supply the entire 
market since imported 
goods will be allowed 
local goods may no 
longer be bought.
SDT has allowed the 
company to grow and it 
has increased the 
efficiency of healthcare 
and assisted with the 




Tabulated responses to a questionnaire on the provisions of benefits of Special and Differential Treatment to the LDCs
Company Sector/
Product(s)
No. of Persons 
Employed
Benefits Received Years Receiving 
Benefits
Will CSME affect 
benefits?
Further Comments




1993-present Yes, negatively it will 
expose us to more 
competition from 
MDCs who can 
produce at a much 
cheaper rate.
SDTs has made us more 
competitive; we have 
been able to improve 
efficiency and reduce 
costs.
Carib Pasta Pasta Products 38 Import Restrictions; 
however this does not 
seem to be in force 
presently.
12 years Yes, it will affect the 
industry negatively.
SDT helped to establish 
business locally and 
venture into other OECS 
countries but the rules 
are not currently being 
enforced.









1.Concessions on full 
Government Tax
2. Concessions on 
import duties on all 
raw materials; 
packaging materials 3. 
Concessions on import 
duties of building 








There is still the need for 
protection from large 
breweries from outside 
of the region which even 
with freight costs 
sometimes turn out to be 
cheaper than the local 
breweries
Vingren Gas Co, Industrial Gases 2 or
sometimes 3





Tabulated responses to a questionnaire on the provisions of benefits of Special and Differential Treatment to the LDCs
Company Sector/
Product(s)
No. of Persons 
Employed
Benefits Received Years Receiving 
Benefits
Will CSME affect 
benefits?
Further Comments
Davy Agro Pasta Manufacturers 16 Some Import 
Restrictions though It 
does not always seem 
to work.
No answer No answer Not enough information 
is given out about the 
program; word of mouth 
among businessmen is 
how one finds out. 
Implementation of this 
article is a problem; 
there seems to be a 
struggle with the 
customs dept.




No Answer Don’t Know N/A N/A Knows Nothing of either 
Article 56 or 164.
Source: Questionnaire elaborated and administered by ECLAC on the benefits o f Special and Differential Treatment.
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Table 2




Curry powder Saint Lucia 1
Pasta products Grenada, St. Kitts, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 11
Industrial Gases Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 5
Wheat flour Grenada, St. Kitts, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3
Aerated beverages and 
beer
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts. Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines 11
Solar water heaters Antigua, Dominica, Saint Lucia 5
Chairs and furniture Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts. Saint Lucia, St. Vincent 23
Art and crafts Grenada, Saint Lucia 3
Total 62
Source: OECS (2006)
The firms and respective products that benefited from article 56 are important to the 
OECS economies in terms of their contribution to consumption expenditures, capital investment, 
exports, the generation of government revenue, employment and output.
Tables 3 and 6 below, show the composition of intra-OECS exports at the bilateral and 
aggregate level. As the data presented in the tables indicate, the export products from the milling 
industry and beverages are the most important products traded within the OECS representing 33 
per cent of the total. All article 56 products account for more than half of intra-OECS trade.
11
In addition, available data indicates that the employment provided by these firms exceed 
7,000 workers and that their combined capital investment represent more than 5 per cent of the 
combined GDP of the OECS. Moreover in some cases, 56 article firms contribute to generate 
more than 7 per cent of tax revenues.
Figure 2







Source: OECS (2006) 13% " 2%
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Table 3
Exports of the OECS to OECS 
2002
Product Product Name No. of Total 
Lines
Imports Value Percentage share Accumulated
share
11 Prod.mill.indust; malt; starches; inulin; wheat g 36 6997.167 19.336427 19.336427
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. 338 5240.531 14.482025 33.818452
48 Paper & paperboard; art of paper pulp, paper/pape 125 2992.246 8.2689676 42.08742
32 Tanning/dyeing extract; tannins & derivs; pigm et 271 2374.752 6.5625445 48.649964
23 Residues & waste from the food indust; prepr ani 80 2006.615 5.5452107 54.195175
10 Cereals 53 1889.455 5.2214431 59.416618
72 Iron and steel. 116 1808.641 4.9981164 64.414735
08 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or me 162 1566.563 4.3291423 68.743877
34 Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing prep 132 1364.938 3.7719586 72.515835
85 Electrical mchy equip parts thereof; sound record 185 995.44 2.7508638 75.266699
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy & mech appliance; 281 940.413 2.5987986 77.865498
25 Salt; sulphur; earth & ston; plastering mat; lime 35 861.238 2.3800012 80.245499
39 Plastics and articles thereof. 366 523.575 1.4468813 81.69238
87 Vehicles o/t railw/tramw roll-stock, pts & access 181 475.704 1.3145914 83.006972
33 Essential oils & resinoids; perf, cosmetic/toilet 109 446.017 1.2325524 84.239524
62 Art of apparel & clothing access, not knitted/cro 245 431.779 1.1932062 85.43273
19 Prep.of cereal, flour, starch/milk; pastrycooks' 50 420.787 1.1628302 86.595561
07 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers. 144 372.718 1.0299932 87.625554
94 Furniture; bedding, mattress, matt support, cushi 135 368.469 1.0182513 88.643805
04 Dairy prod; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible pr 11 328.865 0.908807 89.552612
61 Art of apparel & clothing access, knitted or croc 123 293.009 0.8097202 90.362332
15 Animal/veg fats & oils & their cleavage products; 31 264.25 0.7302457 91.092578
38 Miscellaneous chemical products. 58 235.699 0.651346 91.743924
76 Aluminium and articles thereof. 46 223.758 0.6183474 92.362271




Exports of the OECS to MDCs 
2002
Product Product Name No. of Total Lines Imports Value Percentage share Accumulated
share
34 Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing prep 76 10666.09 23.98 23.98
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. 135 6805.85 15.30 39.29
33 Essential oils & resinoids; perf, cosmetic/toilet 47 4719.95 10.61 49.90
48 Paper & paperboard; art of paper pulp, paper/pape 68 3848.09 8.65 58.55
03 Fish & crustacean, mollusc & other aquatic invert 78 3111.32 7.00 65.55
08 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or me 119 2556.31 5.75 71.30
10 Cereals 42 2467.10 5.55 76.85
25 Salt; sulphur; earth & ston; plastering mat; lime 9 1789.45 4.02 80.87
38 Miscellaneous chemical products. 26 1318.55 2.96 83.84
07 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers. 69 1226.37 2.76 86.59
27 Mineral fuels, oils & product of their distillati 112 669.85 1.51 88.10
61 Art of apparel & clothing access, knitted or croc 40 589.19 1.32 89.42
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy & mech appliance; 102 557.84 1.25 90.68
32 Tanning/dyeing extract; tannins & derivs; pigm et 36 554.50 1.25 91.93
09 Coffee, tea, matn and spices. 33 317.60 0.71 92.64
39 Plastics and articles thereof. 93 281.13 0.63 93.27
11 Prod.mill.indust; malt; starches; inulin; wheat g 14 277.77 0.62 93.90
44 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal. 35 272.23 0.61 94.51
23 Residues & waste from the food indust; prepr ani 22 209.69 0.47 94.98




Exports of the OECS to MDCs (6 digit level) 
2002
Product Product Name








340111 For toilet use (including medicated products) 15 5426.1 12.201 12.201
220300 Beer made from malt. 47 5138.5 11.555 23.756
330610 Dentifrices 12 4687.9 10.541 34.297
340119 Other 8 3367 7.5711 41.869
080300 Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried. 13 2236.8 5.0298 46.898
481910 Cartons, boxes and cases, of corrugated paper or p 10 2072.3 4.6597 51.558
100630 Semimilled or wholly milled rice, whether or not p 24 1964.7 4.418 55.976
252321 White cement, whether or not artificially coloured 1 1585.3 3.5647 59.541
340220 Preparations put up for retail sale 31 1511.6 3.399 62.94
481810 Toilet paper 8 1442.9 3.2445 66.184
380840 Disinfectants 8 1301.8 2.9273 69.112
030379 Other 18 1240.9 2.7904 71.902
030231 Albacore or longfinned tunas (Thunnus alalunga) 2 1088.2 2.447 74.349
220290 Other 15 1061.7 2.3873 76.736
071490 Other 42 987.06 2.2195 78.956
271000 (-2001) Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bitu 111 657.54 1.4786 80.434
321000 Other paints and varnishes (including enamels, lac 28 552.38 1.2421 81.676
610910 Of cotton 10 510.53 1.148 82.824
100620 Husked (brown) rice 12 448.15 1.0077 83.832
340520 Polishes, creams and similar preparations for the 3 290.09 0.6523 84.484
110100 Wheat or meslin flour. 4 266.19 0.5986 85.083
071420 Sweet potatoes 3 231.29 0.5201 85.603




Exports of the OECS to OECSs (6 digit level) 
2002
Product Product Name






110100 Wheat or meslin flour. 22 6739.827 18.62527 18.62527
220300 Beer made from malt. 41 2777.074 7.674346 26.29962
481910 Cartons, boxes and cases, of corrugated paper or p 11 2339.258 6.464457 32.76408
230990 Other 69 1949.803 5.388212 38.15229
220210 Waters, including mineral waters and aerated water 53 1653.538 4.569494 42.72178
321000 Other paints and varnishes (including enamels, lac 70 1600.094 4.421803 47.14358
100630 Semimilled or wholly milled rice, whether or not p 25 1314.345 3.632146 50.77573
721041 Corrugated 22 1216.421 3.361536 54.13727
080300 Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried. 18 914.097 2.526075 56.66334
852520 Transmission apparatus incorporating reception app 4 693.834 1.917386 58.58073
340111 For toilet use (including medicated products) 29 580.467 1.6041 60.18483
100620 Husked (brown) rice 23 574.534 1.587704 61.77253
252329 Other 9 531.892 1.469865 63.2424
320810 Based on polyesters 42 515.504 1.424577 64.66697
481810 Toilet paper 10 504.713 1.394756 66.06173
340119 Other 11 494.647 1.366939 67.42867
330610 Dentifrices 14 338.565 0.935612 68.36428
842959 Other 3 315.745 0.87255 69.23683
040229 Other 1 289.11 0.798945 70.03578
190219 Other 12 286.489 0.791702 70.82748
071490 Other 30 233.44 0.645103 71.47258
721240 Painted, varnished or coated with plastics 6 228.755 0.632156 72.10474
220290 Other 57 228.713 0.63204 72.73678
610910 Of cotton 34 217.196 0.600213 73.33699
761010 Doors, windows and their frames and thresholds for 6 216.202 0.597467 73.93446
Source: WITS (2006)
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Special and differential treatment permitted the establishment of some of the major 
manufacturing firms in the LDCs, such as breweries and milling companies. It has also allowed 
for firms in the LDCs to remain operational and in some cases to expand and grow over time.
Notwithstanding these positive aspects, some the most important goals for which special 
and differential treatment was established, namely to protect intra-LDC market shares and 
encourage capital flows to the LDCs, were only partially or temporarily fulfilled.
The adoption and implementation of special and differential treatment provisions must be 
understood and assessed within the specific context in which they were applied. The adoption 
and implementation of special and differential treatment provisions coincided with a period of 
narrowing disparities in terms of GDP per capita between LDCs and MDCs until the early part of 
the 1990s.10 This is shown in figures 3 and 4.
The former plots the dispersion of the LDCs relative to the MDCs (i.e., sigma 
convergence) for the period 1980-2004. The dispersion between both groups of countries 
declines from 1980 to 1993. Thereafter it trends upwards. The existence of sigma convergence 
for that time period implies a process of catch-up between the LDCs (lower income level group) 
relative to the MDCs (higher income level group).
These findings are confirmed by figure 4 which plots for the same time domain the ratio 
of the GDP per capita of the LDCs relative to that of the MDCs relative to Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago, and relative to Trinidad and Tobago, respectively. In all cases, the ratio is 
less than one throughout the entire sample period. This indicates that the GDP per capita of the 
LDCs is on average below that of the MDCs, that of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, and 
that of Trinidad and Tobago.
Also, the said ratios tend to increase in all cases from 1980 to 1993. This means that the 
GDP per capita of LDCs increased at a faster rate than that of the MDCs. The LDCs show the 
fastest rate of increase relative to the MDCs and to Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. That is, 
there is a process of catching-up.
C. Special and differential treatment in the CARICOM Treaty: An assessment
10 The literature distinguishes two concepts of convergence. These are termed sigma and beta convergence. Sigma 
convergence refers to a decline in the dispersion across a group of countries or regions over time. Sigma 
convergence can be measured by the standard deviation say of GDP per capita or by a coefficient of variation 
(defined as the ratio of the standard deviation over the mean). Beta convergence refers to the relationship between 
the rate of growth of a variable over time (say GDP) and the level of that variable for a given year. The existence of 
sigma convergence between a lower and higher level income countries implies that there is a process of catching-up 
between the former and the latter. That is, the lower income level countries grow at a faster rate than the higher level 
income ones. Sigma convergence is compatible with absolute convergence (See, Barro and Xala-i-Martin, 1995, 
pp.26-28 and 383-386). More recently some authors have explored the possibility of simultaneous convergence and 
divergence. See, Elmslie and Milberg (1996) and Carter (2004).
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Figure 3
Sigma convergence betw een the LDC's and M D C's 
1980 - 2004
Source: EC LAC  on the  basis  of officia l in form ation.
Figure 4
Ratio o f  LDCs GDP per capita to that o f  the M D Cs 
1980-2004
Years
Source: ECLAC on the basis of official information.
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Contrarily, from 1993 onwards the opposite phenomenon occurs. The MDCs which have 
the relatively higher income level grew at a faster rate in per capita terms than the LDCs. During 
this period there is an absence of sigma convergence and thus a catch-up process among both 
country groupings.
The econometric analysis (for Beta convergence) summarized in figures 5 and 6 for 
CARICOM also yields the same results. For the period 1980 to 1992 the rate of growth of GDP
19
is negatively related to a given reference level (1980 in the analysis here presented). The 
relationship is statistically significant. The coefficient of goodness of fit (R2) is equal to 0.53. 
For the period 1993-2004 there is no such statistically significant relationship.
The time period characterized by the absence of convergence and catch-up is also the 
time period during which the LDCs trade market share declined at both the intraregional and 
extraregional level. Thus the intraregional trade performance of LDCs may have been hampered 
in part by the greater degree of disparity between LDCs and MDCs.
Available data for the OECS shows that the market share of the OECS has declined in 
relation to CARICOM and the rest of the world from 0.79 per cent to 0.45 per cent in the case of 
the former and from 3.4 per cent to 1.9 per cent in the case of the latter between 1990 and 2004. 
This represents a loss of roughly 50 per cent of the OECS’ intra-OECS market share. This is 
shown in figure 7 below. This performance of the OECS in other markets follows a similar 
pattern. As an example, in the CARICOM market as well, the OECS lost a significant slice of its 
market share (see section D below).
The behavior of the aggregate measure of market share is representative of that of some 
of the main products that benefit from article 56. As shown in table 7 below, most of these 





Intra-OEC S m arket share in relation  to  CARICOM and the rest o f  the  world
1990-2004
Source: W IT S  (2 0 0 6 ) Years Rest o f  the  world CARICOM
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Table 7
Intra-OECS market share of article 56 products (Percentage averages)
1990-2004
1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Food products 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8
Lemonada 3.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 1.5 2.0 2.4 2.7
Paints 10.4 9.9 9.7 9.7 8.3 8.8 9.0 8.5
Water 17.3 3.3 2.0 2.2 2.2 1.2 1.5 2.9
Candles 32.4 59.3 23.0 19.7 34.0 11.7 9.2 3.5
Flour 48.5 44.3 36.5 40.0 39.0 31.4 32.2 28.4
Spirits 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.2 2.3
Lard and margerine 16.1 12.4 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.2 3.2
Source: On the basis of WITS (2006)
The analysis of capital flows shows that the OECS witnessed a decline of net capital 
inflows since the beginning of the 1980s. That is the OECS were not recipient of resources that 
could have contributed to their overall development. As shown in figure 7 below, the average 
level of the net transfer of resources declined from 16 per cent to 10 per cent of the OECS 
combined GDP between 1981-1986 and 1986-1993, and stayed around that level thereafter.
Moreover the volatility has increased over time. On average the coefficient of variation 





Figure 7: N et resource transfer to the OECS 
1981-2000
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Net resource outflow for OECS 
1991 - 2005
Y e a r s
S o u r c e :  E C L A C ,  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  o f f ic ia l in fo rm a t io n
More importantly the net resource inflow has not been commensurate with the net 
resource outflow, thus generating a financing gap that is the ‘Achilles heel’ of the OECS 
economies. Figure 8 above shows the net resource outflow for OECS economies not taking into 
account debt flows. Expressed as a percentage of GDP it has increased, in absolute terms from 3 
per cent to 12 per cent in the space of roughly a decade (1991-2005).
As a general principle, the financing gap is positively related with a given or ‘target’ 
domestic income growth level and negatively related to the growth in external demand, debt 
service obligations and profit repatriation flows. The greater the domestic growth rate, the 
greater the import level and hence the greater the level of capital flows to finance that level of 
imports. The larger the debt service payments, the greater the foreign exchange requirements. In
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a similar way the larger the proportion of capital flow repatriation, the greater will be the foreign 
exchange requirements to achieve a given ‘target’ growth rate.
As a result, if  debt service obligations and repatriation flows are considered exogenous 
variables, countries such as the OECS that face a financing gap must confront the choice of 
promoting the attraction of capital flows or of revising downwards the target output growth. For 
the most part OECS economies opted, for obvious reasons, for the first alternative. This 
alternative also included the contracting of external debt. This ultimately increased the resource 
outflow.
In fact the period during which the net resource outflow is the greatest coincides with the 
period of debt accumulation in the OECS (86 per cent and 106 per cent of GDP in 1999 and 
2005) and the increase in interest rate payments. These shot up from less than 5 per cent to 42 
per cent of exports between 1999 and 2004 (see figure 9 above ) .
D. A competitive analysis of OECS exports to CARICOM
The export composition of the OECS to CARICOM has not changed substantially over time. 
Table 8 below shows that taking 1985 as a reference year, the majority of products exported in 
1985 (85 per cent of the total) are also those that were exported in 2000 (79 per cent of the total).
Table 8
Main export products of the OECS to CARICOM 
1995-2000
Product 1985 1990 1995 2000
054 Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen or simply preserved; 27.09 2.32 nre 3.14
554 Soap, cleansing and polishing preparations; 9.54 17.10 18.05 14.02
057 Fruit and nuts (not oil nuts) fresh or dried; 8.83 3.03 3.50 4.23
642 Paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape, articles of; 7.48 10.93 11.49 6.79
674 Universals, plates and sheets, o f iron or steel; 6.23 3.79 2.37 3.37
046 Meal and flour of wheat and flour of meslin; 5.87 8.41 11.96 11.71
424 Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, etc.; 4.53 7.03 2.33 nre
081 Feeding stuff for animals (excl. unmilled cereals); 2.93 2.68 2.95 2.75
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted; 2.42 1.71 1.30 1.38
821 Furniture and parts thereof; 2.34 2.87 nre nre
091 Margarine and shortening; 1.98 1.80 1.27 nre
112 Alcoholic beverages; 1.98 4.27 5.49 10.60
775 Other household type, electrical and non-elec. eqpt.; 1.19 2.13 1.15 nre
697 Household equipment of base metal, n.e.s.; 1.00 1.08 0.77 nre
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials; 0.94 2.29 3.26 3.63
111 Non-alcoholic beverages n.e.s.; 0.80 2.19 2.68 4.56
423 Fixed vegetable oils, soft, crude, refined or purified; 0.18 1.72 nre nre
058 Fruit, preserved and fruit preparations; 0.08 2.02 nre nre
553 Perfumery, cosmetic and toilet preparations; 0.07 1.12 nre 6.32
042 Rice; 0.00 3.48 8.52 6.79
Total 85.48 81.96 77.07 79.28
Source: TradeCAN (2002)
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In order to gauge the competitiveness of OECS exports to CARICOM a competitiveness 
matrix was constructed (see table 9 below). The computations were carried out using the ECLAC 
Competitive Analysis of Nations (CAN) software programme.
The analysis combines the increase or decrease of a country’s market share in a given 
product in a given import market with the increase or decrease in the share of a product in a 
given market. When a country’s market share in a product increases (decreases) the country is a 
winner or efficient (inefficient or loser) in the export of that product. When the import market 
share of a commodity increases (decreases) the demand for the product in the said market is 
dynamic (stagnant).
Competitiveness movements refer to the change over time of a product in a market with 
respect to the market share for that product and the share of the product in that market. An 
increasing country share (say, Saint Lucia) in a product whose relative importance in the imports 
of the reference country or trade partner (say Barbados) is growing is referred to as a Rising Star. 
An increasing (declining) country share (say Saint Lucia) in a product whose relative importance 
in the imports of the reference country or trade partner (say Barbados) is growing (shrinking) is 
referred to as a Rising Star (Retreat). A declining country share (say Belize) in a dynamic 
(stagnant) product (a product that is increasing (decreasing) its importance in the imports of 
Barbados) is referred to as a Missed Opportunity (Declining Star).
Table 9
OECS exports to CARICOM
Market share competitive matrix, 1985-1990, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000
at the three digit level and expressed as a percentage of the final year exports
Stagnant commodities Dynamic commodities
First period 59.8 First period 36.6
Second period 37.1 Second period 62.8
Third period 62.2 Third period 37.7
Market share sains Declining stars Rising stars
First period 73.4 First period 41.1 First period 32.3
Second period 43.6 Second period 29.1 Second period 14.4
Third period 44.0 Third period 19.7 Third period 24.4
Market share losses Retreats Missed opportunities
First period 23.0 First period 18.7 First period 4.3
Second period 56.3 Second period 8.0 Second period 48.3
Third period 55.9 Third period 42.6 Third period 13.4
Source: CAN (2002)
The matrix orders commodities following two criteria: their dynamism/stagnation and 
market share gains and losses for three time-periods spanning 1985-1990; 1990-1995 and 1995­
2000 (see table 29 above).
24
In the first period (1985-1990), the OECS benefited from favorable demand conditions 
mainly in stagnant markets. The OECS registered market share gains for most exports (73 per 
cent of the total). The majority of the market share gains (60 per cent) occurred in stagnant 
markets and 37 per cent of the total occurred in dynamic markets.
In the second period (1990-1995), the OECS reversed their market share gains and 
witnessed market share losses in the case of more than 50 per cent of their intraregional exports. 
Also the market share losses occurred mostly in dynamic commodities (63 per cent of the total).
In the third period (1995-2000), the OECS member States maintained their market share 
standing from the previous period (that is, the percentage of market losses remained roughly 
constant). However, contrarily to the second period the majority of market share losses occurred 
in stagnant commodities.
Detailed empirical evidence at the product level (presented in tables 30 and 31 below) 
reveals that on average the OECS intraregional market share for its major commodities steadily 
declined between 1985 and 2000 (7.6 per cent, 7.6 per cent, 5.98 per cent, 5.75 per cent for 1985, 
1990, 1995 and 2000, respectively). At the same time, the average import share of the 
commodities exported by the OECS to CARICOM decreased from 0.40 to 0.33 between 1985 
and 1990 and then increased to 0.41 in 1995 and remained at that level in 2000.
The same evidence also shows that in 1985, the OECS held a market share greater than 
25% in five products and a market share greater than 10 per cent in nine of the products exported 
intra-regionally. In 2000, the OECS had an intraregional export market share greater than 25 per 
cent in only one commodity (meal and flour of wheat and flour of meslin) and a market share 
greater than 10 per cent in only five products (soap, fruit and nuts, meal and flour of meal, 
alcoholic beverages and rice).
Furthermore the results presented indicate that only five products witnessed an increase 
in intraregional market share between 1985 and 2000. This list comprises meal and flour of 
wheat (25 per cent and 44 per cent in 1985 and 2000, respectively), alcoholic beverages (5 per 
cent and 12 per cent in 1985 and 2000), non-alcoholic beverages (6 per cent and 9 per cent in 
1985 and 2000), travel goods (1 per cent and 2 per cent in 1985 and 2000), perfumery and 
cosmetics (0.2 per cent and 7 per cent in 1985 and 2000), stone, sand and gravel (0.2 per cent 
and 6 per cent in 1985 and 2000) and rice (0 per cent and 11 per cent in 1985 and 2000).
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A. The provisions for special and differential treatment in the Revised Treaty
The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001) sought to deepen the regional integration 
process by establishing the CSME.11
The CSME was born from the desire “to advance beyond the Common Market towards 
more comprehensive integration, recognizing that while it had achieved significant liberalization 
of the market for goods, the further development of the regional economy was constrained by 
restrictive Treaty provisions limiting the free movement of services and capital and skilled 
labour” (CARICOM, 2000).
Its explicit objectives include the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons; 
more intensive coordination of macroeconomic policies and economic relations; and the 
harmonization of laws governing trade and other economic activities within the common market 
area. It also provided for full application of the Common External Tariff (CET). This entailed 
simplifying the CET structure and reducing its level, with a view to diminishing its protectionist 
content.
Implementation of the CSME called for the creation of new institutions to manage the 
deepening of the integration process. The original treaty was amended by nine protocols 
affecting the structure of the organization, the movement of capital and labour, and policies 
regarding trade, agriculture and transport in the region.
The new integration framework contained in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001) 
maintains the recognition of differences in size and development contained in the treaty 
establishing CARICOM (Treaty of Chaguaramas, 1973). The treaty’s Common Market Annex 
differentiates between LDCs and the MDCs.
The asymmetry issues are mainly addressed in Chapter VII of the revised Treaty. There 
are also good endeavour clauses (i.e., parties in the negotiation should take into account the 
special needs of the LDCs) throughout the treaty.
Following preliminary considerations Chapter VII is divided into two sections. The first 
provides a regime for disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors. The second provides a 
special regime for less developed countries.
Even though the scope of special and differential treatment in the Revised Treaty is 
broad, the discussion has centered on two aspects, article 164 and the Establishment and 
Functioning of the Regional Development Fund (article 158). Article 158 belongs to the first 
regime and article 164 to the second regime of Chapter VII.
It is important to note that, as in the case of the CARICOM Treaty, special and 
differential treatment comprises an aspect dealing with flows of goods (a real sector aspect) and
III. Special and differential treatment in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
11 Th is  is stated in  the firs t p ream bular paragraphs o f  the R evised  Treaty .
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another one dealing with flows of money (a monetary and financial aspect). In this sense, the 
Revised Treaty recognizes that trade and finance are two complementary aspects. Nonetheless, 
there are no provisions for the regulation of capital or financial flows. Instead the focus is on the 
removal of restrictions to the movement of capital among CSME signatory economies (p.e., Art. 
40).
B. The Regional Development Fund
Central to the first regime contemplated in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas for 
disadvantaged countries, sectors, and firms is the establishment of a development fund (Art. 158) 
whose purpose is the provision of financial or technical assistance to disadvantaged countries, 
regions, and sectors. Disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors are defined in article 1 of the
Revised Treaty. 12
The term ‘disadvantaged’ should be understood as the inability to fully participate in the 
CARICOM integration agreement. From the point of view of this study, ‘disadvantage’ results 
mainly from size, policy implementation, external shocks and temporary development conditions 
(see table 10 below).
The less developed countries are, at least for the OECS, considered disadvantaged mainly 
because of the limitations imposed on their development by their small size.
Policy implementation refers to the negative impact or consequences of the operation of 
the CSME. In the case of disadvantaged countries the Revised Treaty (Art. 1) makes reference to 
“the adverse impact of the operation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.” In the case 
of both disadvantaged regions and sectors the Treaty makes explicit reference to economic 
dislocation. At the sectoral level disadvantaged sectors refer to a sector, in which ‘economic 
enterprises experience dislocation from the operation of the CSME.” (Art. 1.)
Table 10
____________________________ The Regional development Fund_____________________________
Disadvantaged
12
The concept of a development fund is not new. The concept was put forward at the Twenty First Meeting of 
CARICOM Ministers Responsible for Foreign Affairs. The objective was to guarantee the effective participation of 
the smaller less developed economies by facilitating their international trade competitiveness within the context of 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas Agreement. In 1998, the Government of Guyana under President Cheddi Jagan 
submitted a proposal for the establishment of a Regional Development Fund to the XXI Latin American Council 
Meeting of the Latin American Economic System. The Regional development Fund was renamed as the Regional 
Integration Fund. The objectives of the Regional Integration Fund were fourfold:
(i) strengthen and diversify the productive base of the smaller economies of the Western Hemisphere 
through the promotion and facilitation of enterprise development and private sector participation;
(ii) foster infrastructural development, including telecommunications infrastructure, in these economies;
(iii) encourage human resource and technological development in the smaller economies, and
(iv) facilitate the competitiveness of the goods and services produces by the smaller economies.
See, The Regional Integration Fund. Assisting the Smaller Economies Towards the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas. Second Summit of the Americas. Santiago, Chile, April 18-19, 1998. Compiled by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Guyana. See also, Address by His Excellency Dr. Cheddi Jagan, to the Hemispheric Summit 
Conference on Sustainable Development. Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 7-8 December 1996.
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Country Region Sector
Size Less Developed 
Countries
Policy implementation Adverse impact of 
the operation of the 
CSME
Economic dislocation 
from the operation of 
the CSME
Economic Dislocation 
from the operation of 
the CSME
External factors Natural disasters Natural disasters Natural disasters
Development condition Temporary low levels 
of development 
HIPC Status
Temporary low levels 
of development
External shocks refer to natural disasters, which cause impairment of resources at the 
country level and region level, and economic disorder at the sectoral level. Note that the level of 
exposure to natural disasters is one of the main explanatory variables of vulnerability.13
13 According to the standard definition vulnerability is “associated with exposure to external economic factors. It is 
the consequence of two sets of factors: (1) the incidence and intensity of risk and threat; and (2) the ability to 
withstand risks and threats and to ‘bounce back’ from their consequences.” In turn the threats have their origin in the 
particular characteristics o f some of the smaller economies, remoteness insularity, and economic exposure. This 
general definition of vulnerability has paved the way for arguing that the vulnerability of the smaller economies is 
structural rather than conjectural. That is, it does not depend or is not a consequence of policy decisions. It is 
independent of political or economic choice. Vulnerability proponents have clearly emphasized that this concept is 
not related to measures of economic performance such as GDP per capita. A country can have an internationally 
relatively high GDP but be still vulnerable (i.e., The Bahamas).
The vulnerability index for any country is defined as the predicted value of its output volatility. The predicted value 
of output volatility is obtained by regressing the actual value of output volatility on variables for economic exposure 
remoteness and insularity and susceptibility to environmental events and hazards (Atkins, Mazzi, and Easter, 2001). 
According to the results the preferred estimated equation was:
Outvoli = □ □ □1Vulni *Di + □ □Exdepi +D nDiv i 
Where, Outvoli = actual output volatility 
Vulni = susceptibility to natural disasters 
Exdepi = export dependence 
Div i = export diversification index
D = dummy variable
i = 1,...., N and N is the number of selected countries.
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Figure 10
Schema of Chapter VII of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
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Finally temporary development conditions include ‘temporary low levels of economic 
development’ and Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) status.
In the first regime, the provision of technical and financial assistance through the 
development fund is complemented by other measures and arrangements. These include, at the 
general level, temporary derogations from the obligations of the Treaty, measures to attract 
investment and industries among others (see figure 10 above for synthetic schema of the major 
provisions of the regimes included in Chapter VII).
The debate and analysis of the regional fund has centered to a great extent on its size and 
financing mechanisms. These aspects are certainly important. There are, however, fundamental 
issues that must be clarified and addressed if the development fund is to be used for the 
countries, regions and sectors it seeks to benefit.
First, Chapter VII should provide a clearer and accurate definition of the role of the 
development fund. As matters stand, due to the broad definition of ‘disadvantaged,’ the 
development fund has a dual role. It acts as a development fund per-se (long-run) and at the same 
time as a compensatory fund (short-run). These are two separate and distinct concepts requiring 
perhaps different actions and funding mechanisms as well.
Second, Chapter VII states that the measures for disadvantaged countries, regions and 
sectors for both regimes are of a transitory or temporary nature (Art.143.1). It is understandable 
that measures of a transitory or temporary nature be undertaken to deal with short-run factors 
such as ‘temporary low levels of development’ or negative impact arising out of the operation of 
the CSME or ‘external shocks.’ It is harder to understand how measures of a transitory or 
temporary nature can deal effectively with the economic limitations imposed by small size. 
These are not of a temporary nature.
Third, Chapter VII should define dislocation and the economic boundary between 
dislocation and non-dislocation in a precise manner. In addition it should specify, at least in 
terms of broad principles, the reasoning, mechanisms and institutions through which it can be 
determined that a given dislocation is indeed caused by the operations of the CSME and not by 
any other factor or phenomenon.
Fourth, Chapter VII should define the relationships and interdependence between sector, 
region and country, for this affects the type of measure that should be implemented when one of 
these geographical entities is affected by the operations of the CSME. A negative impact on a 
sector may spill over to the regional and, eventually, to the country level. Chapter VII should 
explain, at least at the general level, how the measures contained therein are to deal with 
geographical externalities.
Fifth, as currently defined, the development fund can lead to a free-rider problem and 
moral hazard issues. Some firms including those belonging to the most important economic 
sectors (cement, brewery, paint, metal, food and beverage, paper and paperboard, and distiller 
industries) have undertaken plans to restructure. Restructuring is a strategy to achieve a higher 
level of competitiveness in the face of greater competition brought in part by the operation for
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the C S M E  and thus a strategy to  avo id  the n eg a tiv e  im p act o f  the C SM E . F irm s that restructure, 
u n lik e  firm s that do not restructure, h a v e  le s s  lik e lih o o d  o f  b e in g  n eg a tiv e ly  a ffected  b y  the  
operation  o f  the C SM E . T hus the firm s that do not restructure are lik e ly  to  b en efit  from  the  
d ev e lo p m en t fund w h ereas firm s that are restructuring m ay not b en efit  from  the fu n d ’s fin an cia l 
and tech n ica l a ssista n ce  s in ce  th ey  m ay sim p ly  not b e  co n sid ered  ‘d isad van taged .’
F in a lly , the d ev e lo p m en t fund shou ld  address the b a sic  d ev e lo p m en t p rob lem s o f  the  
C aribbean in  a reg ion al and con certed  strategy . T he d ev e lo p m en t fund sh ou ld  sp ec if ica lly  g iv e  
priority to  the factors that h a v e  b een  fou n d  to  b e  the drivers o f  e co n o m ic  grow th . T h ese  in clu d e  
the d ev e lo p m en t o f  hum an capital, in v estm en t in research  and d ev e lo p m en t and the reform  and  
d esig n  o f  an infrastructure fa c ilita tin g  c o m p etitiv en ess . In  th is  sen se , the d ev e lo p m en t fund  
shou ld  fo l lo w  the broad g u id e lin es  and o b jec tiv es  o f  the Integration  R eg io n a l Fund (se e  fo o tn o te  
11 a b o v e).
C. Regional development funds: The European Experience
C A R IC O M  is  n ot the on ly  reg ional in tegration  agreem en t con tem p la tin g  the  
estab lish m en t o f  a d ev e lo p m en t fu n d . T his has a lso  b een  on e  o f  the m ain  o b jec tiv e s  o f  the m ost  
p erfected  region al in tegration  agreem ent, that o f  the E uropean U n ion . T he E uropean U n io n ’s 
ex p erien ce , w h ile  d ifferent than that o f  the C aribbean, can p rov id e v a lu ab le  le s so n s .
E u rop e’s reg ion al p o lic y  is  on e  o f  e co n o m ic  and so c ia l co h esio n . It is  a q u estion  o f  socia l 
articulation rather than on e  fo c u se d  on  e c o n o m ic  grow th . T he p o lic y  o f  socia l articu lation  is  
carried out through structural actions. T h ese  com p rise  structural and c o h es io n  funds (se e  tab le  
11 b e lo w ) . T he form er and latter represent 9 0  per cen t and 10 per cen t o f  the total fu n d s a llocated  
to  structural a c tio n s. T he largest program m e is  the E uropean R eg io n a l D e v e lo p m e n t Fund  
(E R D F ), w h ich  absorbs 58 per cen t o f  structural fu n d s .14 Structural action s represent on e  third  
o f  the E uropean U n io n  b u d get and for  2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 6  are estim ated  at 3 per cen t o f  the E uropean  
U n io n ’s G D P  for 1999.
T he d isparities in  reg ion al agreem ents, such  as for  ex a m p le  the E uropean U n io n , are 
m easured  b y  the resp ectiv e  G D P s per-cap ita  rela tive  to  the m ean . T he countries that are b e lo w  
the m ean  are term ed ‘d isa d v a n ta g ed .’ T h o se  exh ib itin g  a G D P  per capita  ab ove  the m ean  are the  
‘ad van taged ’ reg ion s. T he advan taged /d isad van taged  threshold  has ch an ged  over  tim e. In the  
ca se  o f  the E uropean  U n io n  the threshold  w a s  set at 9 0  per cen t in  1991 and then  at 75 per cen t  
in  1999  o f  the average G N P  and G D P  for E urope
14 The others include the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and the 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance.
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Table 11 
Structural actions in Europe 
Objectives and funds
Objectives
Structural funds Cohesion funds
Objective 1:
Development and structural adjustment of the 
poorest regions of Europe. The poorest regions are 
those whose GDP per capita is below 75% of the 
European average expressed in purchasing power
Objective 2:
Economic and social restructuring of regions with 
regional deficiencies.
Objective 3:
Adaptation and modernization of education systems, 
training and employment.
Objective:
Supports transportation and infrastructure projects.
Cohesion funds are allocated to the states with a per 
capita national product below 90% of the European 
Average measured in purchasing power. These 
states are: Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
Structural actions by beneficiary countries as a percentage of the total and of their respective GDPs






Source: On the basis of World Bank. European Integration, Regional Policy, and Growth. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank (2003).
T he im p act o f  structural fu n d s in  the E uropean U n io n  can b e  d iv id ed  in to  a dem and and  
supp ly sid e  e ffects . T he form er refers to  the e ffe c t  o f  in creasin g  expenditure on  aggregate  
dem and. T he latter refers to  the e ffe c t  on  the prod u ctive  potential o f  an eco n o m y . T he dem and  
e ffe c t  is  g en era lly  v is ib le  in  h igh er expenditure le v e ls  and short-term  reduction  region al in co m e  
disparities. N o n e th e le ss , it is  in su ffic ien t to  ju stify  the u se  o f  structural funds b eca u se  it is  
tantam ount to  equating  structural funds w ith  in co m e transfer m ech an ism s. H o w ev er , su p p ly -sid e  
e ffe c ts  are harder to  id en tify .
It is  gen era lly  accep ted  that structural fu n d s h ave had a p o sit iv e  im p act on  the  
d ev e lo p m en t o f  E urope and the co n v erg en ce  o f  its m em b er countries as attested  b y  the Spanish  
and Irish ex p er ien ces. B e s id e s  dem and and supply  e ffec ts , so m e authors h ave a lso  id en tified  the  
p o sit iv e  e ffe c ts  o f  reg ion al aid on  the im p rovem en t in  the ‘quality  o f  exp en d itu res and  
in stitu tio n s.’15
H o w ev er , the u se fu ln ess  o f  structural fu n d s and region al aid  in  E urope has n ot g o n e  
u n ch a llen ged . B od rin  and C an ova  (2 0 0 3 , p .8 9 ) v ie w  structural funds as pure transfer
15 Funck et Al. Overview in European Integration, Regional Policy and Growth. Eds. Bernard Funck and Lodovico 
Pizzati (2003). The World Bank: Washington D.C.
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m ech a n ism s w ith  fe w  p o sit iv e  lon g-term  e ffec ts . In addition , both  authors c la im  that th ese  
generate ren t-seek in g  b eh a v io r  and th ey  lead  to  “ in e ffic ie n t a lloca tion  o f  resou rces w ith in  
reg io n s that are the m ain  b en efic ia r ies  o f  such  transfers” . In their o w n  w ord s structural funds  
lead  to: “ ...su b o p tim a l a llo ca tio n  o f  reg ion al labour, capital and entrepreneurship and to  a se lf-  
perpetuating system  o f  exp ecta tion s in  w h ich  b e lo w - average in co m e  le v e ls  are a lm ost ‘so u g h t’ 
b y  the reg ion al adm inistrations as a con d u it for additional fu n d in g .” 16
T he E uropean  exp er ien ce , a lthough  o b v io u sly  d ifferen t than that o f  the C aribbean, 
shou ld  alert p o lic y  m akers in  the C aribbean that structural funds shou ld  n ot b e  seen  as a panacea  
for grow th  and co n v erg en ce . Structural fu n d s are a m ean s to  attain th o se  g oa ls. Fundam ental to  
th is  en d eavor is  the p rec ise  sp ec ifica tio n  o f  the m ech a n ism s that sh ou ld  b e  u sed  for their  
attainm ent, and the p rec ise  id en tifica tion  and dem arcation  criterion for their u se  and  
b en efic ia r ies . Structural fund p ro v is io n s, i f  th ey  are to  b e  u sefu l, m ust m o v e  b ey o n d  the realm  o f  
the general princip les.
D. The Special Regime for Less Developed Countries
T he seco n d  reg im e o f  C hapter V II, targeted  to  L D C s, com p rises e ig h t articles (A rtic les  
160 to 1 6 7 ). E x c lu d in g  article 164 w h ich  w ill b e  dealt w ith  in  the n ex t section , th ese  can, in  turn, 
b e d iv id ed  in to  three groups. T he first group (com p risin g  articles 165 and 167) p rov id es  
p ro v isio n s in  favor o f  the L D C s and B e liz e . T he article referring to  the L D C s refers to  p u b lic  
undertakings.
T he seco n d  group can b e  term ed ‘the g o o d  en d eavou r c la u se s ’ . T h ese  are four (artic les  
161, 162, 163 and 166), that is  h a lf  o f  the total. T h ey  are articles in  w h ic h  the sp ecia l n eed s o f  
the le s s  d ev e lo p ed  countries are taken in to  account. T he sp ecia l n eed s are taken in to  accou n t in  
the ap p lica tion  o f  the co m m o n  external tariff, ru les o f  orig in  and the im p lem en ta tion  o f  
in cen tiv es . H o w ev er , throughout th ese  articles there is  n o  com m itm en t or guarantee that th is w ill  
b e the case.
T he third group com p rises article 166 w h ic h  m ak es referen ce to  the im p o sitio n  o f  im port 
duties and m o st im portant article 164 w h ich  rep laces, at the end o f  D ecem b er  2 0 0 5 , article 56  o f  
the C A R IC O M  Treaty. T he ap p lica tion  o f  both  is  subject to  the authorization  o f  C O T E D  and in  
the seco n d  ca se  the d ec is io n  o f  the C ou n cil for Trade and E c o n o m ic  D e v e lo p m e n t (C O T E D ), 
requires “the affirm ative v o te s  o f  all the le s s  d ev e lo p ed  countries and at least tw o  o f  the m ore  
d ev e lo p ed  cou n tries.”
F rom  the p o in t o f  v ie w  o f  th is  study, the reco g n itio n  that the L e ss  D e v e lo p e d  E co n o m ies  
o f  C A R IC O M  are con sid ered  d isad van taged , in  the sen se  o f  not b e in g  ab le to  fu lly  participate in  
an in tegration  agreem ent, is  eq u iva len t to  reco g n iz in g  that th ese  countries are not co m p etin g  or 
n ego tia tin g  on  the sam e fo o tin g  as larger and/or m ore d ev e lo p ed  eco n o m ies.
A s  a result, a reg im e ad d ressin g  the n eed s o f  the le s s  d ev e lo p ed  e c o n o m ie s  o f  C A R IC O M  
shou ld  in c lu d e  m ore than ‘g o o d  en d eavou r’ or ‘con d ition a l c la u ses  or p r o v is io n s .’ In fact it 
shou ld  in c lu d e  a set o f  p ro v is io n s p rov id in g  for asym m etric  treatm ent to  le v e l the p la y in g  fie ld .
16 Boldrin, M. and Canova, F. (2003) Regional Policies and EU Enlargement in Funck et Al. Op.cit.
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T he form u lation  o f  sp ecia l and d ifferential treatm ent p ro v isio n s w ith in  C A R IC O M  cou ld  
w e ll start b y  fo llo w in g  th o se  put forw ard in  the W T O  tex ts  (1 9 9 4 ). In the W T O , the co n cep t o f  
sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent is  em b od ied  in  a set o f  p ro v is io n s a llo w in g  d ev e lo p in g  
countries greater f le x ib ility  in term s o f  o b lig a tio n s and tim e fram es. T h ese  p ro v is io n s are 
grouped  under four headings: (i)  th o se  reco g n iz in g  the in terests o f  the lea st d ev e lo p ed  and  
d ev e lo p in g  countries; ( ii)  the m easu res that reduce or ea se  the ru les and o b lig a tio n s that 
d ev e lo p in g  e c o n o m ie s  h a v e  to  m eet; ( iii)  the p ro v is io n s p rov id in g  for lo n g er  tim e-fram es for the  
im p lem en ta tion  o f  ob ligation s; and (iv )  the p ro v is io n s for tech n ica l a ssista n ce  (W T O , 1 999c , 
p .2 2 5 ) .17 T h ese  m easu res cou ld  p rovid e a b lueprint for the typ e o f  asym m etric  treatm ent n eed ed  
b y  d isad van taged  countries to  b e  ab le to  fu lly  participate in  the C SM E .
E. Article 164 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
In the R e v ise d  Treaty, article 164 rep laces article 56  o f  the C A R IC O M  treaty w h o se  
p ro v isio n s exp ired  in  D ecem b er  2 0 0 5 . T he fo c u s  o f  article 164 is  the su sp en sio n  o f  com m u n ity  
orig in  treatm ent to  any im ports on  grounds o f  production  in  the L D C s.
A rtic le  164 is  not granted on  an autom atic b a sis  but m u st rather b e  negotia ted . It is  
granted on  the b a sis  o f  e c o n o m ic  reason s and for a lim ited  period. T he firm  or industry  
req u estin g  the b en efits  o f  article 164 m ust sp ec ify  h o w  it p lans to  u se  the period  requested .
T he p rocess in v o lv es: (i) req u estin g  the b en efits  o f  article 164; ( ii)  the support o f  tw o  
M D C s to  u se  article 164 as a tem porary m easure; (iii)  the ratification  o f  the request b y  C O T E D  
and b y  the C om m u n ity  C ouncil; and (iv )  the ratification  b y  the C o n feren ce o f  H ea d s o f  
G overnm ent.
C O T E D  d ec id ed  at its 19th m eetin g , and at the request o f  O E C S m em ber States, to  
undertake con su lta tion s w ith  C A R IC O M  m em b er States w ith  the aim  o f  d ev e lo p in g  p rop osa ls on  
m easu res to  prom ote the industrial d ev e lo p m en t o f  the L D C s in  accord an ce w ith  the p ro v is io n s  
o f  article 164. T he con su lta tion s aim  to  preserve and ex ten d  the c o n c e ss io n s  o f  article 56  and are 
centered  on  the orig inal lis t  o f  article 56  products.
O ne o f  the k ey  argum ents put forw ard for p reserv in g  the c o n c e ss io n s  granted b y  article  
56  is  the disparity o f  co sts  am on g m em b er States o f  C A R IC O M . A s  a general rule, firm s or 
countries that h a v e  lo w er  co sts  h ave a greater potential to  im p rove their com p etitiv en ess . M ore
17 See, WTO. Special and Differential Treatment. Sypnosis of WTO Agreements and Related Topics. 
MM/LIB/SYN4. 23 October 2000 for a detailed list o f the provisions of the WTO Agreements on Special and 
Differential Treatment. Caribbean economies have built on the WTO provisions to propose additional provisions 
specific to smaller economies meant to allow the progressive integration of smaller economies in the current 
multilateral trading regime. These can be grouped under seven headings. (Bernal, 2001): (i) a lower level of 
obligations; (ii) asymmetrically phased implementation timetables; (iii) best endeavor commitments; (iv) 
exemptions from commitments in certain areas; (v) flexibility in application and adherence of disciplines under 
prescribed circumstances; (vi) enabling access to mediation; (vii) technical assistance and training.
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sp e c if ic a lly  d ifferen ces in  co st  structure are seen  as lea d in g  to  a cu m u la tive  p ro cess  o f  
asym m etries such  as that d escrib ed  b y  V erd oorn ’s L a w .18
In the particular case  o f  C A R IC O M , b ig g er  e c o n o m ies  h ave for the m o st part lo w er  costs  
due the com p arative large sca le  o f  production , a c c e ss  to  lo w er  co st  m aterials due p la in ly  to  
natural resource en d o w m en ts (com p arative  advantage). T able 12 b e lo w  sh o w s the structure o f  
co sts  in c lu d in g  energy , com m u n ica tion s, transport and labor for C A R IC O M  eco n o m ies . It is  
read ily  seen  that so m e o f  the b ig g er  e c o n o m ie s  h ave greater co st advantage in  energy, 
co m m u n ica tion s and labor.
O n the b a sis  o f  the said  con su lta tion s, the recom m en d ed  strategy b y  th e  O E C S for the  
ap p lication  o f  article 164  is  the substitution  o f  quantitative restrictions b y  price m easu res  
(ta r iffs).19 T he ta r iff  m easu res w o u ld  b e  app lied  on  a tem porary b asis. T he tim e fram e for their  
ap p lication  w o u ld  b e  gu id ed  b y  fin an cia l and e co n o m ic  con sid eration s. T he in troduction  o f  
tariffs seek s to  protect and expand  the O E C S d o m estic  m arket share.
A s  a resu lt the O E C S firm s and ind u stries w o u ld  rep lace e x istin g  quantitative restrictions  
b y  tariffs w h ich  w o u ld  b e  le v ie d  at h igh er  than ex istin g  rates. T h is im p lie s  the su sp en sio n  o f  the  
C E T  rates. A lso  the O E C S m em b er States h ave requested  that the M D C s su sp en d  C E T  treatm ent 
w ith  resp ect to  third countries as w e ll in  resp ect o f  beer, m alt and flour.
18 In a nutshell Verdoorn’s Law establishes a relation between growth of output and productivity growth. It states 
that greater output leads to greater productivity. In the particular case referred to above lower costs lead to greater 
output which in turn induces a faster rate of growth of productivity. See, McCombie J., Pugno, M. and Soro B. 
(2002) Productivity growth and economic performance (Macmillan: New York).
19 In other words tariffs would be applied on regional and non-regional products.
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Table 12
Comparative costs for Caribbean economies
Cement price buildup Port Costs ElectricityCosts
Transportation
















Barbados 1025.60 0.11 1235 1.00 0.65
Jamaica 504.14 0.11 1519 0.80 0.25




325.53 159.00 724.55 0.03 1.27 0.72
Antigua and 
Barbuda
298.20 55.50 438.42 0.17 3.28
Dominica 23.81 3.53 12.00 222.00 61.05 221.40 0.26 1790 1.81 0.61
Grenada 8.23 5.51 10.00 179.20 111.00 296.00 0.16 1780 2.12 0.61
St. Kitts and 
Nevis
38.02 3.69 13.00 0.16 2.87 0.61
Saint Lucia 12.37 6.73 10.00 88.80 29.60 0.17 1385
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines
8.23 5.51 10.00 148.00 64.80 188.19 0.36 1635 1.32 1.20
Note: The cement price buildup consists o f three components, landed costs, average trading costs, and freight prices. Landed cost includes port/cargo and tonnage dues, 
landing charges, transport dock charges and stevedoring. Average cost comprises transport, average handling and burst of bags costs. Vessel port costs include terminal 
user and mooring charges, and terminal charges. The data was provided by PLIPDECO. The data is made comparable by using a sample vessel, the Tropic Carib. Specs. 
The vessel has the following specifications NRT = 3,601; GRT = 10,851 and LOA = 159.9).Electricity costs are defined in terms of US cents per kilowatt hour. 
Transportations costs refer to ocean freight rates of shipping one 20 or 40 foot container from a Caribbean country to Jamaica. Telecommunication cost is the 
international daytime rate per minute from the country of origin to the United States. Fuel cost is the price of gasoline (unleaded) and diesel per litre. Factory rental is 
the cost per year per sq. foot. Data on wages is expressed on an hourly basis and is shown for the minimum wage, and skilled and unskilled workers when available. In 
the case of the minimum wage, data for Saint Lucia refers to the manufacturing and tourism sectors. For Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago the minimum wage is the 
national minimum wage. In the case of St. Kitts and Nevis, the minimum wage is that paid in the manufacturing sector (in the Hotel and Casino sector the minimum 
wage is 1.41 US).
Source: Author’s own computation on the basis of official and country data.
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Table 13
Proposal for the extension of benefits to the OECS under article 164
Tariff rates (in percentages)














Aerated beverages 30 80 100 10 ERP One of the most sensitive products to be affected by liberalization. High cost production.
Aerated waters 25 and 30 80 100 10 ERP One of the most sensitive products to be affected by liberalization. High cost production.
Beer 11.00/lg 80 100 10 ERP Time frame of investment required to expand capacity.
Malt 25 80 100 10 ERP Time frame of investment required to expand capacity.
Coconut water 0 0 0 0 ERP
Candles 30 40 50 7 ERP
Wheat or meslin flour 5 and 25 80 100 10 ERP Time frame of required to pay off investments and buffer stock against excess supply.




30 50 100 5 ERP
Production mainly for the domestic market. Require 
support to expand.
Animal feed 5, 25 and 30 50 100 10 ERP Time frame of required to pay off investments and buffer stock against excess supply.
Wooden furniture 10 40 50 10 ERP Time frame of required for expansion and modernization.
Solar water heaters 30 40 50 10 ERP Time frame of required for expansion and modernization.
Industrial gases 5, 20 and 25 40 50 10 ERP
Note: ERP = effective rate of protection. 
Source: OECS (2006)
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That is , the le v e l o f  ta r iff  protection  afforded  to  O E C S firm s and industries w ith  resp ect  
to  third countries sh ou ld  b e  app lied  and institu ted  throughout C A R IC O M . M o reo v er  the O E C S is  
seek in g  to  en cou rage jo in t  co llab oration  w ith  the M D C s to  d ev e lo p  a program m e o f  e ffe c t iv e  and 
operational a ssista n ce  to  prom ote the industrial d ev e lo p m en t in  the O E C S. F in a lly , the products 
b en efitin g  from  the p ro v is io n s o f  article 164 shou ld  ‘rece iv e  the d es ig n a tio n ’ o f  sen sitiv e  
products, and as a resu lt sh ou ld  b e  subject to  the s lo w e st p ace  o f  lib era lization , and exc lu d ed  
from  any ta r iff  c o n c e ss io n  granted b y  the M D C s on  a b ilateral or m ultilateral b asis.
T ab le 13 ab ove  sh o w s the current and p rop osed  ta r iff  rates b y  product b en efitin g  from  
article 56. T he tab le a lso  in d ica tes the a ccom p an y in g  tim e fram e for the granting o f  b en efits  
under article 164 and the rationale for the tim e fram e. In certain ca ses  the tim e fram e co in c id es  
w ith  the period  o f  m aturity o f  an in vestm en t. In other ca ses , the tim e fram e is  requested  on  
grounds o f  h igh  costs, e x c e ss  supply  and vu ln erab ility  to  external con d ition s
F. Special and differential treatment and the rules of origin
Sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent, as con tem p lated  b y  article 56  in  the C A R IC O M  Treaty  
or article 164 in  the R e v ise d  Treaty o f  C haguaram as, centers around the “ su sp en sion  o f  
C om m u n ity  orig in  treatm ent to  any d escrip tion  o f  im ports e lig ib le  on  grounds o f  production  in  
on e  or m ore d ev e lo p ed  cou n tries.” It refers to  the im p o sitio n  o f  restriction s on  im ports.
H o w ev er , the T reaty and R e v ise d  Treaty a lso  con tem p late  the reverse sid e o f  the coin . 
That is, th ese  tex ts  con tem p late , under sp ecia l c ircu m stan ces, the granting o f  com m u n ity  orig in  
to  an extraregional product. That is, it grants sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent and therefore  
discrim in ates in  favou r o f  se lec ted  extraregional products. W h ile  th is m easure is  ava ilab le  to  all 
C A R IC O M  m em b ers, the larger countries, b y  the structure o f  the eco n o m y , are prone to  u se  it on  
a m ore regular b asis.
Contrary to  a p rotection ist m easu res w h ich  k eep  products ou tsid e  a g iv e n  sphere, and are 
therefore a static m easure, the granting o f  ru les o f  orig in  is  dynam ic. Its ap p lica tion  can in fact 
lead  to  the im portation  o f  inputs w ith  lo w er  co st and h igh er quality  and tech n o lo g ica l content. 
T his, in  turn, can set up a scen ario  for  d yn am ic learn ing  e c o n o m ie s  o f  scale.
T he im p lem en ta tion  o f  the C E T  requires the sp ec ifica tio n  o f  ru les o f  origin . T h ese  are 
fou n d  in  articles 31 and 3 2  in the C A R IC O M  Treaty and articles 83 and 84  in  the R e v ise d  Treaty  
o f  C haguaram as.
A cco rd in g  to  A rtic le  84  o f  the rev ised  T reaty o f  C haguaram as, a co m m o d ity  is  treated as 
b e in g  o f  C om m u n ity  O rigin  i f  it has b een  ‘w h o lly  p roduced  w ith in  the C om m u n ity  or i f  it has  
b een  produced  w ith in  the C om m u n ity  w h o lly  or partly from  m aterials im ported  from  ou tsid e  the  
C om m u n ity  or from  m aterials o f  undeterm ined  orig in  b y  a p ro cess  w h ich  e ffe c ts  a substantial 
tran sform ation .’ T he transform ation  is  characterized  b y  the d ifferen ce  in  the H arm on ized  C od e  
T a riff H ea d in g  o f  the m aterial input and the final product.
A rtic le  83 a llo w s  the producer to  obtain  inputs from  extraregional sou rces w h en  ‘unab le  
b y  reason  o f  c ircu m stan ce b ey o n d  h is control to  obtain  su p p lies o f  the reg ion al m a ter ia ls .’ T his
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c la u se  is part o f  the su sp en sio n  fa c ility  o f  the Treaty w h ich  states that tariffs m ay b e  suspended  
or altered w h en  a product is  not produced  b y  the com m u n ity , w h en  the quantity o f  the product 
b e in g  p roduced  in  C A R IC O M  d o es not sa tisfy  the reg ion al dem and or w h en  the quality  o f  the  
product is  b e lo w  that o f  the reg ion al standard.
A s  a result, extraregional inputs can b e  granted C A R IC O M  co m m o n  m arket orig in  
a llo w in g  fo re ig n  producers to  ga in  preferential a ccess  to  the reg ion al m arket w h ile  at the sam e  
tim e perm itting a ccess  to  lo w er  co st  inputs from  o u tsid e  the reg ion , i f  n ecessary .
Inputs for the d ev e lo p m en t o f  e co n o m ic  sectors and industrial production  can b e  granted  
d uty-free treatm ent w h en  b e lo n g in g  to  the lis t  o f  co n d itio n s for duty exem p tion s. T h ese  are end- 
u ser  defin ed . C A R IC O M  m em bers can d ec id e , at their o w n  d iscretion , w h ic h  lis t  o f  a c tiv itie s  to  
in c lu d e  in  the lis t  o f  e x em p tio n s .20
A t the sam e tim e, the C E T  S ch ed u le  a lso  in c lu d es a lis t  o f  co m m o d itie s  w h ich  are non-  
e lig ib le  for duty ex em p tio n s .21. T his lis t  com p rises so m e o f  the m o st im portant co m m o d itie s  
traded w ith in  C A R IC O M  (cem en t, paints, w aters, flour, am on g  others). T his lis t  p rotects not 
o n ly  so m e o f  the m o st im portant co m m o d itie s , but a lso  the firm  structure, w h ich  is  h ig h ly  
concentrated , corresp on d in g  to  each  o f  th ese  co m m o d ities . A rtic le  83 o f  the ru les o f  orig in  can  
b e u sed  to  obtain  ta r iff  ex em p tio n s on  the lis t  o f  in e lig ib le s  for duty exem p tion s.
In general the su sp en sion  m ech an ism  p rov id ed  b y  article 83 has b een  u sed  b y  the b ig g er  
e c o n o m ies  o f  the Caribbean. T he larger e c o n o m ie s  are m ore d iv ersified  than the sm aller  ones. 
T he greater the degree  o f  d iversifica tion  o f  an eco n o m y , the greater is  the lik e lih o o d  that it w ill  
require inputs or in term ediate  g o o d s  that can on ly  b e  su p p lied  b y  extraregional suppliers.
R ecen t ava ilab le  data sh o w s that the C A R IC O M  Secretariat rece iv ed  for the period  M ay  
to  D ecem b er  2 0 0 4 , 4 0 9  requests for the su sp en sio n  o f  the C E T  under paragraph 3 o f  article 83 o f  
the R e v ise d  Treaty. O w n  estim ation s reveal that th is  represents 3 per cen t o f  C A R IC O M  total 
im ports, but 2 4  per cen t o f  in traregional traded products. A  c lo se  in sp ectio n  o f  the data a lso  
sh o w s that 93 per cen t o f  the requests w ere  m ade b y  the b ig g er  e c o n o m ie s  (8 0  per cen t for  
Jam aica and 13 per cen t for  T rinidad and T o b a g o ) (se e  figu re  11 b e lo w ). T he num ber o f  O E C S  
requests for the ap p lica tion  o f  the su sp en sio n  m ech an ism  w a s  m in im a l.22
20 See, Gonzales, op.cit.; World Bank (1990) op.cit. and the Common External Tariff of the Caribbean Common 
Market. Second Edition (1996). Volume 3. Revised Draft Incorporating the Decisions of the 17th Special Meeting of 
the Common Market Council, 9-10 June. Caribbean Community Secretariat. Pp.774-781.
21 See, The Common External Tariff o f the Caribbean Common Market. Second Edition (1996). Vol. 3. pp.782-812.
22 The computations here presented should be understood as an illustration of the fact that bigger economies are for 
the most part the beneficiaries of the suspension facility of article 83. Other estimations show that Trinidad and 
Tobago is the country that makes the most use of this facility. See Hamilton and Associates (2002).
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A n  an a ly sis  at the product le v e l sh o w s that a sig n ifica n t part o f  th ese  can  b e  c la ss if ie d  as 
products w ith  a h igh  tech n o lo g ica l con ten t. In turn, products w ith  a h igh  tech n o lo g ica l content 
con stitu te  a v e h ic le  that a llo w s  the gen eration  o f  p ro cesses  o f  lea rn in g -b y -d o in g . T his b y  it s e lf  
can b e  a m ean s for structural ch an ge and grow th  and thus for d iv ersify in g  the m anufacturing  
sector . T h is p rocess can b e  further en h an ced  b y  unrestricted  a ccess  to  certain ca tegor ies o f  
sk illed  labour as currently con tem p lated  in  the C S M E  p rov ision s.
G reater d iv ersifica tio n  and the u se  o f  the C E T  su sp en sion  m ech an ism  are correlated . 
H o w ev er , it has not b een  determ ined  w h eth er  d iv ersifica tio n  lead s to  the greater u se  o f  the  
su sp en sio n  m ech an ism  or v ic e  v ersa .23 T here is  a lso  the p o ss ib ility  that d iversifica tion  and the  
su sp en sio n  fa c ility  o f  the C E T  h ave a b i-d irection a l relationsh ip  and feed  b ack  on  each  other.24
T he ru les o f  orig in  jo in tly  w ith  the lis t  o f  con d ition a l duty ex em p tio n s and in e lig ib le s  for  
duty ex em p tio n s protect the d ev e lo p m en t o f  e c o n o m ic  sectors, the m ain  traded co m m o d itie s  
w ith in  C A R IC O M  and the n o n -co m p etitiv e  con d itio n s for the supp ly  and production  o f  g o o d s. In 
th is  sen se  the trading reg im e is  not co n d u c iv e  to  the gen eration  o f  e ff ic ie n c y  or op tim ality  
con d itio n s or for the ex ist in g  production  structures in  the w a y  th ese  co n cep ts  are u n d erstood  by  
the m ainstream  ec o n o m ic  literature.
T o  the ex ten t that the b ig g er  e c o n o m ies  m ake greater u se , m ain ly  due to  their s ize  and thus  
le v e l o f  d iversifica tion , o f  the su sp en sion  m ech an ism  th ese  can en h an ce their le v e ls  o f
23 That is correlation does not imply causation. The causality issue remains an area for further research.
24 In their review of trade policy instruments and administrative practices governing the operation of the CARICOM 
CET and rules of origin, Hamilton and Associates write (2002, p.17): “The use of the CET suspension mechanism 
stimulates competitiveness in intra-regional trade”. Countries or exporters, which secure most of the suspension of 
the CET/derogation from the Rules of Origin, are the most competitive exporters to CARICOM. See, Hamilton, T. 
and Associates (2002). Final Report to Review of trade policy instruments and administrative practices governing 
the operation of the CARICOM CET and rules of origin. CARICOM-Secretariat.
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co m p etitiv en ess . T o the exten t that the su sp en sio n  m ech an ism  can  b e c o m e  a v e h ic le  for the  
creation  o f  d yn am ic p ro cesses , it can further en h an ce the ex ist in g  le v e ls  o f  d iv ersifica tio n  and  
e ffic ie n c y  o f  th ese  eco n o m ies . T his, in  turn, can w id e n  rather than narrow  the ex ist in g  d isparities  
and in eq u a lity  o f  in itial co n d itio n s b e tw een  the L D C s and M D C s and thus o ffse t, to  so m e extent, 
the in ten d ed  o b jec tiv e s  o f  sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent p rov ision s, w h ich  seek  to  le v e l the  
p la y in g  f ie ld  b e tw een  L D C s and M D C s.
IV. Special and differential treatment in CARICOM: lessons learned
A s o r ig in a lly  co n c e iv e d  in  the C A R IC O M  T reaty, sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent w a s  
a th ree -leg g ed  strategy com p risin g , protection  from  external com p etition , a ccess  to  fin a n ce  and  
the regu lation  o f  capital f lo w s . In practice  the ap p lica tion  o f  sp ec ia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent 
w a s lim ited  to  the ap p lica tion  o f  quantitative restrictions.
T he p ro v is io n s for sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent a llo w ed  the estab lish m en t o f  so m e o f  
the m ajor firm s in  the L D C s as re flected  in  their export potentia l, output, contribution  to  
govern m en t reven u e and em p loym en t. M oreo v er  the L D C s exh ib it a traditional export structure  
dem onstrated  to  b e  resilien t in  the fa ce  o f  adversity . T he array o f  in traregional export products  
that represented  m ore than 80  per cen t o f  the total in  1985 still accou n ted  for rou gh ly  80  per cen t  
o f  the total in  2 0 0 0 .
H o w ev er , the p ro v is io n s for sp ecia l and d ifferential treatm ent h ave fu lf illed  o n ly  part o f  
the o b jec tiv e  for w h ich  th ey  w ere  in troduced  in  the C A R IC O M  leg a l tex ts. Indeed , the em pirical 
ev id en ce  sh o w s that the O E C S has lo st  m arket share at the in tra-O E C S le v e l and at the aggregate  
lev e l. A rtic le  56  products h ave sh o w n  a sim ilar behavior.
It has b een  argued that sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent has n eg a tiv e  or in sig n ifica n t  
e ffects . H o w ev er , sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent p ro v is io n s can h ave p o sit iv e  e ffe c ts  as sh ow n  
b y  the a va ilab le  em pirical ev id en ce  (se e  tab le  14 in  the A n n ex).
T he lo ss  in  m arket share occurred in  fact during a period  o f  w id en in g  d iv erg en ce  over  
tim e b e tw een  L D C s and M D C s. A t a broader le v e l the O E C S situation  reflects  the general 
m acro eco n o m ic  perform ance o f  the O E C S w h ich  has b een  characterized  e sp ec ia lly  in  the 1990s  
b y  lo w  grow th  and im p en d in g  m acro eco n o m ic  d isequ ilibria . T he deterioration  in  export 
p erform ance is  re flected  in  C A R IC O M ’s lo s s  o f  its m arket share o f  g o o d s  and serv ices  in  its 
m ajor extraregional m arkets overtim e.
Indeed , ev en  serv ices  w h ich  are the lin ch p in  o f  grow th  for the O E C S h ave not b een  
im m u n e from  th is trend. T he grow th  o f  the serv ices  sector has stagnated  and the grow th  o f  
export serv ices  has d ec lin ed  o v er  tim e. In addition, serv ices  h a v e  b een  produced  in e ffic ien tly , as 
the resource fo reg o n e  in  order to  attract capital f lo w s  d irectly  to  the serv ices  sector  has ex ceed ed  
for m o st O E C S e c o n o m ie s  the net capital resou rce in f lo w  (se e  figu re  12 b e lo w ).
M ore im portantly w h at has h appened  during the 1 9 9 0 s is  that the O E C S has n ot b een  
recip ien t to  fore ign  capital f lo w s  rather, the sm aller e c o n o m ie s  o f  C A R IC O M  h a v e  actually
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transferred resou rces to  the rest o f  the w orld . T his ‘perverse p h en o m en o n ’ is  in  fact the k ey  to  
the understanding o f  the O E C S perform ance during the 1990s.
F igure 12
N e t resou rce  transfer and rev en u e  fo reg o n e
25 -,
A n t ig u a  a n d  
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S o u r c e :  IMF a n d  E C L A C  (2 0 0 3 ) □  N e t r e s o u r c e  t r a n s f e r  □  R e v e n u e  f o r e g o n e
0
In the R e v ise d  T reaty o f  C haguaram as sp ecia l and d ifferentia l treatm ent p ro v is io n s are 
in c lu d ed  m ain ly  in  C hapter VII. C hapter V II co m p rises  tw o  reg im es. T he first d ea ls w ith  
disad van taged  sectors, reg ion s and sectors. T he seco n d  reg im e d ea ls w ith  the L D C s o f  
C A R IC O M .
A s  ex p la in ed  in  the corresp on d in g  sec tio n  o f  th is d ocu m en t, the first reg im e shou ld  g iv e  a 
m ore p rec ise  d efin itio n  o f  the term s g u id in g  its p rin cip les, p ro v is io n s and recom m en d ed  actions.
T he reg ion al fund, a center p ie c e  o f  C hapter V II, as it ad d resses fin an ce, d ea ls w ith  tw o  
separate issu es , th o se  o f  com p en satory  and structural actions. T h ese  m ust b e  d istin gu ish ed  for  
th ey  m ay require d ifferen t criteria for im p lem en ta tion  and fund ing. T he form er am ounts to  an 
in co m e  transfer m ech an ism  (short-run) w h ereas the latter is  m eant to  estab lish , at lea st partly, the  
fou n d ation s for su sta in ab le grow th  and d ev e lo p m en t (long-run).
In addition , the fund is  prone to  free-rider and m oral hazard issu e s  that m u st b e  addressed.
F in a lly  the fund shou ld  tack le  so m e o f  the fundam ental constraints on  the d ev e lo p m en t o f  
the sm aller e c o n o m ie s  o f  C A R IC O M  and b e  gu id ed  accord in g  to  the general g u id e lin es  
co n c e iv e d  in  the C aribbean P rop osa l for the R eg io n a l Integration  Fund for the F ree Trade A reas  
o f  A m ericas (F T A A ).
T he study o f  e c o n o m ic  h istory  sh o w s that p rotection ism  can h ave a b en efic ia l im p act on  
grow th  w h en  accom p an ied  b y  other ty p es o f  m easures. That is , protection  b y  i t s e lf  d o es  not 
guarantee con tin u ity  in  tim e nor d iversifica tion  or grow th . T he e v id en ce  o f  p re-W orld  W ar I 
E urope is  a case  in  point.
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The consensus conclusion of the empirical evidence of the pre- WWI European case is 
succinctly stated by Bairoch (1993): “it remains generally true that in all countries (except Italy) 
the introduction of protectionist measures resulted in a distinct acceleration in economic growth 
during the first ten years following a change of policy and that this took place regardless of when 
the measures were introduced.”25 As well, more recently, Ha-Joon Chang (2002) makes the case 
that the developed countries used during their period of industrialization “interventionist 
industrial, trade and technology policies to promote infant industries during their catch-up 
period.”
In a globalized and liberalized world, interventionist policies can focus on delineating 
and implementing export promotion policies. Export promotion policies are virtually non­
existent in most CARICOM countries. Although there are export promotion institutions that 
provide assistance to firms, the linkages and follow-up processes are very weak. Fundamental to 
the success of an export promotion policy is the creation of an export culture of which export 
training courses and programmes are an essential component. Export success is not the product 
of laissez-faire, but the result of a concerted public policy effort. As well, initiatives should be 
conceived to improve the productivity of imports.
The implementation of Chapter VII is very important for the success of the CSME. The 
CSME is a dynamic, continuous and sequential process. Its success requires that policy makers 
understand that dynamic processes unfold in historical time. And historical time is irreversible.
As a result, the definitions and concepts, goals and expectations of the CSME must be 
attuned to its impending reality. The objectives of the CSME must conform to the economic 
reality which it seeks to change and transform. This is a key reason for the necessity to 
incorporate special and differential treatment in a manner that promotes growth, productivity and 
employment, where trade and finance provisions are part of an integration text.




Summary of findings of recent studies on special and differential treatment
Purpose Findings Conclusions
• Clark (1997). A Diffusion Model of the Process of Implementing the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.
- This study analyzes the share of 
preferential exports, in total exports 
over time, for CBERA beneficiaries, 
in order to seek estimates of the 
adoption rates and upper limit on 
participation under the tariff 
preference scheme.
- 13 of 21 countries examined showed 
varying degrees of success in utilizing 
provisions of the CBERA.
- Adopting a tariff preference 
scheme allows beneficiaries to 
increase their share of preferential 
exports in total exports over time.
- It also seeks to identify factors 
responsible for inter-country 
differences in the rates and levels of 
CBERA participation.
- Trade orientation of a beneficiary prior 
to implementation of the CBERA is 
important in determining CBERA 
participation.
- Logistic function of beneficiaries 
as a group remains a cause for 
concern as the estimated ceiling 
share (15 per cent) is close to 
ceiling attained in 1989 (13.6 per 
cent).
- Trade orientation is important in 
determining CBERA adoption rates and 
ceiling participation values.
- New CBERA provisions, due to 
go into effect in 1992, extend 
product coverage to include those 
areas previously excluded from 
CBERA eligibility.
- Ratios of agricultural exports, 
agricultural imports, and manufactured 
imports relative to GNP are positively 
correlated with CBERA participation 
measures.
- There is a lack of association between 
manufactured exports relative to GNP and 
CBERA participation as many 
manufactured products consistent with 
the comparative advantage of 
beneficiaries are not eligible for duty free 
treatment and also because most 
manufactured products are already 
eligible for duty-free GSP status.
Inadequate infrastructure and limited 
labor supply in some beneficiary 




• Loper, Abbott and Foster (2003). Preferential Trade of Agricultural Commodities in the Caribbean Basin
- This paper examines the performance of 
agricultural exports under the Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) 
as well as the trade component of the CBI 
and the GSP programs from beneficiary 
countries to the US.
- The first group of non-preferenced goods 
(bananas, coffee and cocoa) have 
experienced low prices and low export 
earnings due to worldwide imbalances 
between supply and demand.
- The second group covered under 
CBERA and GSP, in relation to the former
- meat and sugar, meat exports to the US 
from CBI countries dropped considerably 
from 1993-2002. In relation to sugar, 
exports from CBI countries to the US were 
negatively affected due to the Uruguay 
Round. Changes in US domestic farm 
policies and NAFTA allowed CBI 
countries to lose market share due to 
diminished quotas.
- Third group, all other groups under 
CBERA/GSP, is divided into demand 
driven, successful and crowded-out goods. 
This group also experienced preference 
erosion but differs in the way the erosion 
occurred. Exports for demand-driven 
goods were affected by demand and 
supply fluctuations in the US. Goods 
which were successful were likely to have 
found a niche in the US market, while 
other goods have been crowded out 
because exports from CBI countries may 
not have been as competitive as goods 
from other sources.
- Competition from other sources and not 
a decline in US import demand led to the 
observed trends in CBI exports to the US.
- CBERA and GSP have become a larger 
component of total agricultural exports, 
increasing from 38.3 per cent in 1989 to 
54 per cent in 2002.
- By disaggregating the trade data it was 
found that preferential trade programs 
have been continuously successful and 
have expanded at faster than10% per year 
from1989 to 2002 in six goods: live tree 
slips or cuttings, dasheens, fresh or dried 
pineapples, cantaloupes, frozen orange 
juice, and ethyl alcohol.
- Exports for politically sensitive goods 
such as meat and sugar fell as trade 
barriers limited CBI access to US markets.
- Through the Armington model, it was 
possible to examine the effect of 
preference erosion effects versus import 
demand, export supply and structural 
change effects on market share changes.
It was found that preference erosion 
contributed in small measure to falling 
market shares and that large variation in 
market shares through time can be 
attributes to relative import price changes.
- Three groups of export products are 
examined in order to analyze export 
trends. First group includes non- 
preferenced goods not covered under 
CBERA or GSP. Second group includes 
goods covered under CBERA and GSP 
where imports are affected by quantitative 
restrictions such as tariff rate quotas 
(TRQ) and the third group includes other 
goods benefiting from CBERA and GSP 
programs.
- The Armington model used in this 
analysis was not good at predicting 
structural change observed in the trade 
data which could have been useful for 
some goods that have been successful 
under CBERA and GSP programs.
- The paper hypothesizes that goods that 
have been successfully exported may be 
differentiated and goods with declining 
exports may be homogeneous and have 
been crowded-out. It assumes that 
differentiated goods will have a small 
elasticity of substitution (using the 
Armington model)26.
- Preference erosion as calculated by 
model predictions from tariff changes 
accounted for a fraction of observed 
market adjustments.
26 The Armington model recognizes that goods may be differentiated, that is, source providers from different countries that export the 
same good may be imperfect substitutes. It uses a two-stage utility maximization process. The first stage determines the total demand 
for a good, while the second stage specifies a constant elasticity of substitution demand function.
45
Purpose Findings Conclusion
• Nilsson, Lars. (2002) Trading relations: Is the roadmap from Lomé to Cotonou correct? (full text article not sourced)
- This paper makes a comparative analysis 
of the effects of the EU’s Lomé 
Convention and GSP on exports of 
developing countries using a gravity type 
model.
- R esu lts  o f  the paper in d icate  
p o sit iv e  and sta tistica lly  s ign ifican t  
export e ffe c ts  o f  b oth  the L o m é  
C on ven tion  and the G S P .
- E xport e ffe c ts  are greater for the  
L o m é C on ven tion  for the study  
p eriod  from  1 9 7 3 -1 9 9 2 .
- It illustrates EU country distribution of 
the export effects and shows that Belgium 
and the Netherlands are the EU countries 
that have increased their exports the most 
from the developing countries under both 
the Lomé Convention and the GSP 
schemes.
• Topp, Vernon. (2003). Are trade preferences helpful in advancing economic development?
This article examines whether trade 
preferences serve as an effective tool for 
development assistance to poor countries. 
It asks the question of whether other 
measurers could be more efficient and 
effective. The analysis is elaborated by 
examining the implications of trade 
preferences for the subgroup of LDCs. 
Findings are based on UNCTAD’s 1999 
data concerning the use of preferences by 
countries under the major GSP schemes.
- In considering the question of whether 
major schemes offer preferences to LDCs 
for the types of goods they export, it was 
found that major schemes do not offer 
preferences to LDCs for the types of goods 
they export. It was found that for the EU, 
most of the imports from LDCs are 
covered by preferences, Japan’s covers 41 
per cent of dutiable imports from LDCs, 
while low coverage from Canada and the 
US is provided to LDCs.
- Trade preferences do not encourage high- 
cost producers who depend on them to be 
innovative or competitive.
- Trade preferences are inconsistent with 
the goal of trade liberalization.
- Major industrialized countries have used 
trade preferences to extend protectionist 
policies to selected developing countries.
- The article also considered whether 
LDCs make full use of the preferences on 
offer. In this regard, it was found that 
LDCs use most of the preferences on offer 
for their exports only to some countries 
and not to the EU, where potential 
coverage for preferences is greatest.
- There are serious underlying flaws and 
limitations in existing preferential schemes 
which should be addressed collectively by 
industrialized countries before granting 
further preferences.
- It was also found that preferences were 
not a very important factor in overall 
exports from LDCs since they covered 
only 18 per cent of total LDC exports to 
the major developed preference providers 
(excluding US petroleum imports).
- Industrialized countries should focus on 
providing developing countries (LDCs) 
with assistance to improve efficiency and 
competitiveness of their economies.
- Poor countries need to improve their 
capacity to produce high-quality, cost 
competitive goods.
• Stoeckel, Andrew and Brent Borrell. (2001). Preferential Trade and Developing Countries: Bad Aid, Bad Trade.
This study aims to analyze and explain why preferential trade is not a possible route to development for developing countries and is 
damaging to world trade.
In making the case that preferences are 
harmful to developing countries, this study 
finds that they serve to insulate producers 
from competitive pressures and weaken 
disciplines to control costs. This has a 
negative effect, as insulated producers 
adopt new cost reducing technologies at a 
slower rate than producers who are fully 
exposed to global competition.
- Preferences do not work. They impose 
costs on non-preference receiving 
countries who become non-competitive in 
the export market in which the preference 
is granted, their sales drop, they therefore 
export and import less which is costly to 
world trade.
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• Stoeckel, Andrew and Brent Borrell. (2001). Preferential Trade and Developing Countries: Bad Aid, Bad Trade.
This study aims to analyze and explain why preferential trade is not a possible route to development for developing countries and is 
damaging to world trade.
Purpose Findings Conclusion
- The argument is illustrated through 
various case studies. Mauritius receives 
subsidies through preferential access to the 
European Union for its sugar produce, yet 
the sugar industry in Mauritus is 
struggling. The country has also retained 
tiny mills, less than the size of efficient 
mills operated by competitive exporters, 
making then uncompetitive.
- For recipient countries, preferences have 
a negative effect as they encourage rent- 
seeking behavior, create vested interests 
that block reform, hinder competition 
policy and distract policy attention from 
development.
- The case of Mauritius illustrates that 
preferences have insulated the sugar 
industry from competitive developments 
within its economy and the world sugar 
market.
- Preferences weaken the central principle 
of non-discrimination of the WTO.
- A case study of Cuba further reveals that 
subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the loss of preferential market 
access, Cuba’s sugar industry has become 
internationally uncompetitive. This 
illustrates that preferences can make a 
country vulnerable to their removal and do 
not offer stability to the country.
- The article concludes with the view that 
developing countries would be better 
served if  preferences were discarded and 
an open trading system based on non­
discrimination and untied aid delivered 
directly to countries that need it.
- As it refers to the Philippines, 
preferential access to the US market was 
established in 1898. However, this was 
lost in the 1980s resulting in the stagnation 
of the Philippine industry to the extent that 
the industry has decreased exports by 80 
per cent and now imports sugar to meet 
domestic needs.
- Both developed and developing countries 
gain from non-discriminatory trade 
liberalization through increased 
competition, efficient use of resources, 
innovation, best practice and increased 
growth.
- The study concludes that non- 
discriminatory trade liberalization by 
developed countries and unilateral 
liberalization of their own economies 
would be more in the interests of 
developing countries than preferential 
arrangements.
